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Innovation is central to economic growth and human
welfare. Government officials and commentators have recog-
nized this reality and have called for a variety of different sub-
stantive incentives for stimulating innovation. But the
question of how an innovation regulator should be structured
has received little attention. Such consideration is important
not only because of the significance of innovation but also be-
cause current government innovation policy is so haphazard.
There is no government entity that looks at innovation
broadly, and the narrower agencies that regulate aspects of in-
novation policy not only fail to pay systematic attention to in-
novation goals but often act at cross-purposes with each
another.
In this Article, Professors Benjamin and Rai analyze how
government policy on innovation should be structured.
Drawing on existing theoretical and empirical work, as well as
their own original empirical research, they propose the crea-
tion of an entity in the executive branch that would both ana-
lyze pending agency action and offer regulatory suggestions of
its own. This entity would introduce a new, trans-agency fo-
cus on innovation while drawing upon, and feeding into, ex-
isting executive branch processes that aim to rationalize the
work of disparate federal agencies. This approach, Professors
Benjamin and Rai contend, offers a great improvement over
existing government institutions while avoiding a costly (and
politically infeasible) remaking of the administrative state.
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Introduction
Both theory and empirics support the primacy of technological
innovation in securing long-term economic growth and, ultimately,
human welfare.' Innovation will also be central to addressing the
challenges (for example, environmental challenges) that can accom-
pany economic growth.2 Thus, questions of how to foster technologi-
cal innovation are, quite properly, at the forefront of scholarly
analysis.
The great attention to innovation policy notwithstanding, the is-
sue of which institution(s) should be making these decisions is a rela-
tively underexamined area of the law. Commentators have discussed
at length a variety of substantive innovation inputs and incentives-
for example, patents, trade secrecy, government funding and procure-
ment, availability of venture capital, ownership of innovation "plat-
forms" and "infrastructure," science and engineering education and
graduates, university technology transfer, competition, concentration,
innovation prizes, open and/or collaborative strategies, or so-called li-
ability rules.3 But these discussions have generally been divorced
1 As we discuss below, technological innovation has been shown to be the major impetus
behind the productivity increases that produce long-term economic growth. See infra Part I.A.
2 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2007) (observing that countries have done a much better job of adhering
to the Montreal Protocol on chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs") than the Kyoto Protocol on green-
house gases, in significant part because innovation has produced good substitutes for CFC-pro-
ducing refrigerants but not for greenhouse-gas-generating fuels).
3 See generally, e.g., Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson & John Walsh, Protecting Their Intel-
lectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7752, 2000) (patents and trade secrecy); Stephen
Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge, in 15 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EN-
TREPRENEURSHIP: ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND
GROWTH 1 (Gary Libecap ed., 2004); Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962) (government funding and procurement);
Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 839 (1990) (ownership of platforms and infrastructure); Samuel Kortum & Joshua Lerner,
Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
6856, 1998) (venture capital); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
81-86 (1942) (competition versus concentration); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Re-
wards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (innovation prizes); Arti K.
Rai, "Open and Collaborative" Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 131 (Robert W.
Hahn ed., 2005); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 49-52 (2003) (open access); Yochai Benkler,
Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (open collabo-
ration); J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2004) (liability rules). For an interesting
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from the specifics of regulatory implementation. 4 By the same token,
discussions of specific regulatory systems (e.g., the patent system or
telecommunications regulation) tend to focus rather narrowly on the
particular tools that might be available to agencies and courts that
operate within that system.5 And the more general literature on regu-
latory reform, while addressing in-depth such questions as capture and
cost-benefit analysis, has tended to ignore the central role of innova-
tion in addressing the majority of regulatory challenges. 6
A broad examination of the relationship between regulatory in-
stitutions and innovation highlights certain well-established patholo-
gies of the regulatory state. Specifically, the relative absence of
innovation from the agenda of Congress, the courts, and many rele-
vant agencies-as well as interagency processes such as the central-
ized cost-benefit review performed by the Office of Management and
Budget's ("OMB") Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
("OIRA")-arguably manifests the confluence of two regulatory
pathologies: first, the tendency of political actors to focus on short-
term goals and consequences; and second, their reluctance to threaten
the existing business models of powerful incumbent actors.7 Addi-
tionally, even when Congress, courts, or agencies do think about inno-
vation, they often do so in ways that are contradictory and confused.
Consider the patent system. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 is
unique among the Constitution's grants of power in articulating a pur-
pose, and that purpose sounds in innovation ("To promote the Pro-
gress of ... the useful Arts").8 So one might imagine that Congress
would have created an entity with substantial expertise that would fo-
cus on how patents could best promote innovation. But that is not the
case. Currently, neither the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")
nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (which
hears all patent appeals) has the capacity to promulgate such policy.
The PTO lacks social science expertise, while the Federal Circuit not
taxonomy of "innovation elements," see Alliance for Science & Technology Research in
America, Periodic Table of Innovation Elements (on file with authors).
4 A notable exception is Michael Abramowicz, who examines in detail how an adminis-
trative agency would implement a prize scheme. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting
Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003). However, as the title suggests, Abramowicz's analy-
sis is narrowly focused on a particular patent proposal.
5 See generally, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA?
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEo. L.J. 269 (2007).
6 See infra Part II.C.
7 On this tendency, see infra Part II.B.
8 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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only lacks such expertise but typically disavows any role in articulating
policy. 9 Some agencies with social science expertise do better-for
example, the 1995 guidelines on intellectual property licensing
promulgated by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") are considered well thought out, even by
those who may disagree with them.10 As Professors Michael Katz and
Howard Shelanski have recently pointed out, however, even these
"antitrust agencies" do not model uncertainty well when they engage
in merger review, with the result that mergers with pro-innovation
possibilities could be blocked and mergers with anti-innovation pos-
sibilities allowed to go forward."
When it comes to questions of innovation, the copyright system
arguably fares even worse. Because new technological innovations
(e.g., the VCR, the Internet, and peer-to-peer sharing technology) can
be used in a manner that violates copyright laws, copyright holders
have successfully used doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability
to shut down the technologies.' 2 A rational analysis of whether such
doctrines should apply would carefully consider not only the costs and
benefits of the technology in promoting cultural creation and dissemi-
nation, but also threats to technological innovation that might emerge
from a heavy-handed or uncertain application of indirect liability doc-
trine. The institutions that primarily address issues of copyright-
Congress, the courts, and the Copyright Office-do not perform par-
ticularly well on the question of cultural creation. And they fare even
less well on questions of innovation. The Supreme Court's most re-
cent opinion on the liability of technology purveyors introduces a
novel "inducement" test that decides the issue of secondary liability
by focusing on such nebulous factors as the "intent" of the technology
9 See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1102-10 (2003) (discussing the Federal Circuit's
choice of a formalistic approach to judicial decisionmaking rather than a policy-based approach).
10 See, e.g., John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of
Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 508 (1998) ("The best framework for analyzing intellectual
property licensing practices threatening innovation efficiencies is found in the joint DOJ/FrC
Intellectual Property Guidelines."); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis
and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTrrusT L.J. 537, 540-41
(2007).
11 Katz & Shelanski, supra note 10, at 538.
12 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding
preliminary injunction against Aimster on grounds of contributory liability); A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding, in part, a preliminary injunction
against Napster on grounds of contributory and vicarious liability).
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creator. 13 Such a nebulous test does little to balance costs and bene-
fits. Moreover, it hardly creates the legal predictability that technol-
ogy creators and investors need in order to innovate.
Another set of pathologies involves situations where agencies
pursue innovation strategies that are in tension, if not entirely contra-
dictory. Some of these situations arise because Congress has set up
agencies with contradictory missions. For example, in the case of the
International Trade Commission ("ITC") and the PTO, Congress has
set up agencies whose organic statutes direct them to interpret patents
in divergent ways. In other cases, the organic statutes may allow har-
monization, but harmonization does not occur for other reasons.14
Additionally, the cost-benefit analysis that is part of the regula-
tory review of major agency action undertaken by OIRA could be
greatly enhanced through more thorough consideration of innova-
tion.15 Such consideration would ensure that the cost figures associ-
ated with regulatory compliance accounted for future technological
development. As matters currently stand, because the innovation-re-
lated guidance provided to agencies by OIRA is sparse, 16 agencies
(and OIRA itself) may overestimate the costs of regulatory compli-
ance. More broadly, a robust cost-benefit analysis might consider not
simply the ways in which innovation reduces compliance costs, but
also possible long-term positive effects of inducing innovation through
regulation.
Congress has recently acknowledged the importance of a more
systematic and coordinated approach to innovation policy. The
America COMPETES Act,1 7 passed in August 2007, provides, inter
alia, for a "President's Council on Innovation and Competitiveness"
that will make recommendations on innovation policy.t8 The Act en-
visions a Council with hortatory authority that would be composed of
the heads of the major agencies whose actions affect innovation.19
13 MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 916, 919 (2005) (holding that "one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts
of infringement by third parties").
14 See infra text accompanying notes 73-80.
15 For a brief discussion of the mechanics of OIRA review, see infra text accompanying
notes 95-102.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 108-10.
17 America COMPETES Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572 (2007) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 20. 29, 31, 33 and 42 U.S.C.).
18 Id. § 1006 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3718 (2006)).
19 Another prominent feature of the Act is its authorization of significantly increased
funding for science and engineering research at the National Science Foundation, the National
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In this Article, we go considerably further, proposing an execu-
tive entity that would be independent of existing agencies and would
have more than mere hortatory influence. 20 As we discuss in detail
below, our executive entity would have some authority to push agen-
cies to act in a manner that either affirmatively promoted innovation
or achieved a particular regulatory objective in a manner "least dam-
aging" to innovation. At the same time, the entity in question would
operate efficiently by drawing upon, and feeding into, existing inter-
agency processes within OIRA and other White House offices (e.g.,
the Office of Science and Technology Policy).
Importantly, the existence of this authority would be as likely, or
perhaps even more likely, to lead to regulatory action than is currently
the case. For example, more Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") regulations might pass muster under cost-benefit analysis if
innovation-related effects were calculated. The centralized innovation
regulator might also push agencies like the EPA to regulate in cases
where the regulation was a good mechanism for sending the appropri-
ate price signals necessary for stimulating innovation.
This Article is the first attempt at analyzing how government in-
stitutions as a whole should be structured in order to advance innova-
tion. Indeed, commentators have largely ignored questions of
institutional design when advocating policy goals. Identifying broad
objectives is important, as is articulating substantive policies, but so
too is analyzing how to design government institutions that have the
best chance of pursuing particular social goals and implementing
sound policy. In putting forward this analysis, the Article offers an
analytical framework for such decisions of regulatory design. Al-
though innovation may be the social goal that is most likely to be
given short shrift within the current regulatory structure, it is probably
not the only social goal that is systematically underappreciated.
A caveat on scope: We focus here on the role of regulatory deci-
sions in stimulating, or hindering, innovation. We define regulatory
decisions broadly to include not only congressional legislation and
agency rulemaking, but also adjudicatory decisions made by agencies
and courts.21 Of course, other government action, most notably con-
Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Department of Energy Office of Science.
Whether this authorization will actually result in increased appropriations is quite unclear. See
DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE AMERICA COMPETES ACT AND THE FY
2009 BUDGET 1-2 (2008).
20 As we discuss further below, this new innovation regulator could be a new office or
could be housed within existing White House offices.
21 Notably, several of the agencies whose actions have a significant impact on innova-
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gressional decisions about how to allocate research and development
spending among agencies, may be equally, or even more, important as
an influence on innovation.22 Even within an agency, decisions about
how to allocate research and development spending could have con-
siderable influence on innovation. We focus here on regulation princi-
pally because rationalizing regulation poses legally interesting, and
heretofore unanalyzed, challenges. However, our proposed innova-
tion regulator would logically also have a role to play in rationalizing
innovation-related spending.2 3
tion-for example, the FTC, the antitrust division of the DOJ, and the PTO-act primarily
through adjudication rather than rulemaking.
22 In fact, one recent empirical study provides dramatic evidence that federally funded
innovation, as well as innovation arising from collaborations between private industry and feder-
ally funded research, represents an increasing percentage of breakthrough innovation. See gen-
erally Fred Block & Matthew R. Keller, Where Do Innovations Come From?: Transformations in
the U.S. National Innovation System, 1970-2006 (unpublished working paper sponsored by the
Info. Tech. & Innovation Found., 2008), available at http://www.itif.org/files/Where-do
innovations_comefrom.pdf. According to Block and Keller, in 1971 eighty-six percent of inno-
vations that were recognized by R&D Magazine as among the top 100 innovations of the year
came from large firms largely acting on their own. Id. at 10. In 2006, more than two-thirds of
these award-winning innovations involved some public sector involvement. Id. In recent years,
federal laboratories have been represented particularly well, averaging about thirty-five award-
winning innovations per year. Id.
23 See id. at 19 (noting that although some level of decentralization in research funding is
useful in that it may allow different teams of researchers to take different approaches to the
same problem, the current system "carries decentralization to an unproductive extreme. Under
current arrangements, it is entirely possible that five different government agencies might be
supporting 30 different teams of technologists working on an identical problem without a full
awareness of the duplication of efforts.") Additionally, greater centralization would ensure that
the overall portfolio of research and development efforts served the larger goal of innovation
rather than simply the specific missions of the agencies that disburse research and development
dollars.
Greater centralization would be useful not only in decisions regarding funding of research
but also in coordination of the scattered government programs that promote commercialization
of inventions (e.g., several Department of Commerce programs, various agency-based Small
Business Innovation Research programs). The Information Technology and Innovation Founda-
tion ("ITIF") has recently suggested consolidating (and expanding) these programs through the
establishment of a several billion dollar "National Innovation Foundation." See Robert Atkin-
son & Howard Wial, Boosting Productivity, Innovation, and Growth Through a National Innova-
tion Foundation 4, 27 (unpublished working paper sponsored by the Info. Tech. & Innovation
Found., 2008), available at http://www.itif.org/files/NIF.pdf. Atkinson and Wial note that their
proposed Foundation would not only use grants to promote commercialization and diffusion but
also would "advocate for innovation," id. at 4. However, they do not flesh out how such advo-
cacy would work in contexts where funding was not involved. Similarly, the National Innovation
and Job Creation Act of 2008, S. 3078, 110th Cong. (2008), a bill introduced by Senators Hillary
Clinton, Evan Bayh, and Susan Collins that appears to be modeled on the Atkinson/Wial Na-
tional Innovation Foundation proposal, focuses on funding.
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Our discussion proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the rea-
sons for our focus on innovation and make the argument that govern-
ment policy is important for promoting innovation. In Part II, we
identify examples of pathologies associated with current government
regulation of innovation. Part III takes an institution-specific look at
the assets and liabilities that are most likely to be associated with for-
mulation of innovation policy by each of the available institutional op-
tions (Congress, courts, and agencies). This institution-specific
examination is necessary for purposes of determining where an inno-
vation regulator would be usefully placed. We conclude that housing
an innovation regulator in the executive branch is likely to be the
most efficacious option. Part IV discusses the details of how an inno-
vation regulator would function. Our position on these details-and
specifically on the role of notice-and-comment rulemaking-is in-
formed by original empirical work that we have done on the role of
comments in the innovation context. Finally, we finish with a brief
conclusion, followed by an appendix detailing the results of our empir-
ical work.
L Why Government Innovation Policy Should Be a Priority
A. Why It Is Important
A major goal of any society should be to increase people's well-
being or welfare, broadly defined. 24 Technological innovation-which
begins with the invention of a product or process but also involves
putting the invention into productive use-is a primary contributor to
long-term well-being. By mitigating disease and hunger, biological
and agricultural innovation contribute directly to health. Innovation
in communications and the organization of information fosters educa-
tional, political, and social development. And innovation is the engine
behind economic growth, which is central to increasing well-being,
particularly to the extent that the fruits of this economic growth flow
in some measure to the least well-off.
24 For discussions of social welfare functions, see, for example, Matthew D. Adler, QALYs
and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETmics 1, 50-52
(2006) (discussing the World Health Organization's "Quality of Life" ("WHOQOL") index,
which produces a multi-dimensional profile of scores across six domains (physical domain, psy-
chological domain, levels of independence, social, environmental, and spiritual), and the difficul-
ties with attempting to implement WHOQOL on a policy level). Cf. AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (1999) (discussing an approach based on enhancing "capabilities,"
defined as a combination of health, educational, and other functions, rather than utilities).
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The strong link to economic growth helps define the contours of
our vision of innovation policy (as contrasted to, for example, science
and technology policy).25 Thus, it is worth highlighting briefly. In the
long run, productivity is the key to economic growth. There is no nat-
ural limit on growth in productivity, and in fact, productivity growth
has swung wildly among different countries.26 Although a host of fac-
tors affects productivity growth, technological innovation is particu-
larly important.2 7 Indeed, Robert Solow won his Nobel Prize in part
for showing (based on U.S. economic data from 1909-1949) the cen-
tral importance of "technical change" to growth.28
In the Solow model, technical change was the very large residual
that was left as an explanatory factor after the contributions of labor
and capital to productivity growth had been taken into account. 29 Ac-
cordingly, technical change arguably encompasses more than the types
of improvements in machines and methods of production that we or-
dinarily consider "technological" in nature. For purposes of this Arti-
cle, however, we restrict ourselves to a more limited definition of
technical change-change involving the development and deployment
of technological improvements. This definition of innovation is not
only tractable but it also comports with the most recent data on driv-
ers of productivity growth. Specifically, while the United States ex-
25 Indeed, in our view, science and technology policy is an example of a policy "box" that
does not comport particularly well with a coherent social goal. Science and technology policy
could be used to promote innovation and economic growth, but it could also be used to promote
other goals such as national security or risk reduction.
26 See generally LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & SYLVIA ALLEGRETrO, THE
STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007, at 17 (2007) (discussing the marked changes in U.S.
productivity growth, from 1.4% annually in the mid-1970s, to 2.5% from 1995-2000, and finally
3.3% from 2000-2005).
27 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Gutierrez Calls for Government, Pri-
vate Sector, and Academic Actions on Innovation Measurement (Jan. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleasesFactSheets/PROD01_005059 ("The
United States today is more than 75 percent wealthier in terms of real GDP per capita than it
was 30 years ago, which is largely attributable to productivity gains driven, in large part, by
innovation."); see also Charles I. Jones, Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 220, 223, 235-37 (2002) (finding that research and development accounts for
about 1.46 percentage points of annual GDP growth and further estimating that the social rate of
return to research and development is as high as thirty percent).
28 See generally Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J.
ECON. 65 (1956); Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39
REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957) [hereinafter Solow, Technical Change]. Notably, however, be-
cause Solow saw technical change as an exogenous residual, many econometric studies continued
to focus on capital (and to a lesser extent labor), not technology, as the key to economic growth.
See DAVID AUDRETSCH ET AL., ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 13-16 (2006)
(making this point).
29 See Solow, Technical Change, supra note 28, at 312, 320.
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perienced average annual productivity increases of less than one-and-
a-half percent between 1980 and 1995, since 1995 it has averaged in-
creases of more than two percent. 30 The best explanation for these
productivity increases is the widespread diffusion of advances in infor-
mation and communications technology. 31
Innovation is of course no quick fix: the introduction of new tech-
nologies does not immediately increase productivity. Rather, in-
creases occur only when technologies are fully digested in the
workplace. The rise of the personal computer, for example, began
long before 1995, but it was not until the mid-1990s that businesses
began to really benefit from their use.32 The steam engine took
longer-the increases in productivity arose decades after it was in-
vented.33 But the point is that those increases did come.34 More im-
portantly, innovation is the only reliable long-term method to increase
productivity. 35
Significantly, innovation is also central to addressing the most sa-
lient dangers that earlier productive activity (often spurred by innova-
tion) has created. Innovation that produced economically attractive
alternatives to ozone-layer destroying chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs")
prompted the United States to take the lead in securing rapid interna-
tional agreement to the Montreal Protocol for limiting CFCs. 36 In
large part because of innovation, "the monetized benefits [to the
United States] dwarfed the monetized costs and hence the circum-
stances were extremely promising for American support and even en-
30 See DEAN BAKER & DAVID ROSNICK, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, "USABLE
PRODuCrIVITY" GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON,
1980-2005, at 7, 11 (2007).
31 See generally Harald Edquist & Magnus Henrekson, Technological Breakthroughs and
Productivity Growth, in 24 RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 1 (Alexander J. Field et al. eds.,
2007); William Nordhaus, The Sources of the Productivity Rebound and the Manufacturing Em-
ployment Puzzle (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11354, 2005); DALE W.
JORGENSON, MUN S. Ho & KEVIN S. STIROH, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN
GROWTH RESURGENCE (2005); Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt, Beyond the Productivity Par-
adox, COMMS. ACM, Aug. 1998, at 49, 50.
32 See Edquist & Henrekson, supra note 31, at 33-34.
33 See id. at 9, 14-15.
34 See id. at 9-15. See generally Susanto Basu, John G. Fernald, Nicholas Oulton & Sylaja
Srinivasan, The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth: Or, Does Information Technology Ex-
plain Why Productivity Accelerated in the US but Not the UK? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10010, 2003).
35 See generally Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective
on the Modern Productivity Paradox, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 355 (1990).
36 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 14.
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thusiasm for the agreement. '37 For similar reasons, managing global
warming may require unprecedented levels of innovation.
Yet another salient reason for the importance of innovation re-
lates to timing. Because innovation is highly cumulative-building on
earlier discoveries and developments-small changes in initial innova-
tion conditions can have huge future impacts. Any current event can
have an impact on later events, of course. But the failure to, say, tax a
complex transaction at time T1 can be ameliorated by taxing it at time
T2. If the government nets the same amount of constant dollars, then
the difference of timing is small. By contrast, the failure to sufficiently
encourage an innovation at time T1 may mean that innovators at time
T2 lack a crucial building block and thus that the course of innovation
is significantly retarded.
B. Why the Government Needs to Play a Role
In light of innovation's enormous importance to the future well-
being of our society, a key question is what, if anything, the govern-
ment should do to foster innovation. The answer cannot be "noth-
ing." Even the libertarian skeptic must recognize that, at a minimum,
government needs to establish the legal institutions that allow for effi-
ciency in both market transactions and the formation of firms.
Additionally, optimal levels of innovation will sometimes-per-
haps often-require government regulation beyond that involved in
ordinary competitive markets. Economists have long advanced good
theoretical and empirical arguments for why markets will not allow
innovators to capture a sufficient percentage of the welfare benefits
they produce. With early-stage research, the welfare benefits may be
too uncertain, long-term, and diffuse to monetize, let alone control.38
Problems of uncertainty and lack of appropriability are less acute for
more directed innovation. Even in that case, however, controlling in-
expensive copying is likely to be difficult. 39 Thus, government subsi-
37 See id. at 5.
38 See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 3, at 619 ("To sum up, we expect a free enterprise economy
to underinvest in invention and research (as compared with an ideal) because it is risky, because
the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent, and because of increasing returns in
use.").
39 See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW
OF T E PATENT SYSTEM 59 (Comm. Print 1958) (written by Fritz Machlup) (discussing the idea
that the marginal cost of using an invention that has already been made is zero and that "per-
fectly competitive pricing" will not permit recovery of any of the initial investment necessary to
make the invention). Empirical studies have found that social rates of return from private-firm
research and development are at least twice private rates of return. Charles I. Jones & John
Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q.J. EcoN. 1119, 1120-21, 1133 (1998).
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dies-whether they take the form of patents, allocation to private
parties of spectrum rights, prizes, research funding, or other mecha-
nisms-are likely to be important.
More generally, the weight of economic authority has decisively
turned against Robert Solow's view that technical change is an exoge-
nous variable that cannot be influenced by policy. Leading growth
theorists like Paul Romer have demonstrated that innovation is en-
dogenously determined and emerges as a consequence of knowledge
externalities and spillovers. These externalities and spillovers, in turn,
represent variables on which many forms of government policy, in-
cluding but not limited to subsidies, can have an impact.40
Finally, in cases where innovation produces large social welfare
benefits that are not necessarily reflected in market prices (even mar-
ket prices bolstered through the artificial scarcity created by patents),
government policy will have a large role to play. Such innovation may
arise in contexts, such as the environmental context, where market
prices do not reflect negative externalities. Alternatively, innovation
may particularly benefit those with a limited ability to pay. Under
such circumstances, government actions designed to push the creation
and dissemination of innovation might be attractive.
C. Why Innovation Policy Is Slighted by Ordinary Political
Processes
Absent measures designed to foster careful thinking about inno-
vation, it will likely be systematically ignored and/or misunderstood
by government actors. In the discussion below, we give examples of
pathological regulatory behavior with respect to innovation. A skep-
tic might note that such pathologies are a pervasive phenomenon no
matter what the substantive policy goal. In many cases, existing
agency "boxes" do not even purport to align well with coherent sub-
stantive policy goals. But there is reason to believe that these
pathologies will be even more pervasive in the context of innovation
than in the context of other goals.
There is also some evidence that in recent years venture-capital-backed firms have shifted away
from risky basic and applied research. Atkinson & Wial, supra note 23, at 11.
40 See Paul Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 20-21 (1994).
For example, geographically based industry clusters may be particularly important for producing,
and taking advantage of, externalities and spillovers. Government policy can play a role in en-
couraging such clusters. Atkinson & Wial, supra note 23, at 13-14. Atkinson and Wial also cite
economic research on market failures that may cause entire industries (e.g., the healthcare sec-
tor) to lag behind in the adoption of new technologies. Id. at 12-13.
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First, almost by definition, innovation involves thinking about
long-term outcomes. Government actors have very little incentive to
force themselves to think about long-term outcomes, as they are un-
likely to be around to reap credit (or blame).
Second, the theoretical and empirical literature indicates that
small, entrepreneurial firms with little ability (relative to powerful in-
cumbents) to influence the regulatory process are particularly likely to
be the sources of breakthrough, or disruptive, innovation. On the the-
oretical side, economists from Joseph Schumpeter onwards have
noted that such entrepreneurial firms may be more likely than large
firms with vested interests in existing products to be able to move
outside routine tasks into "untried technological possibilit[ies]. ''4 1 As
an empirical matter, the data indicate that significant innovations in
biotechnology and information technology have been driven by small
firms.42 And to the extent citations to firm patents are a measure of
an invention's significance, 43 it is noteworthy that, in recent years,
small-firm patents have been more likely than large-firm patents to be
in the top 1% of frequently cited patents." Unfortunately, large in-
41 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, DEMOCRACY 13 (1942); see also WIL-
LIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRA-
CLE OF CAPITALISM 57-59 (2002) (describing the significance of the entrepreneur in facilitating
innovation); MICHAEL CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: HARNESSING THE
POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW (forthcoming 2009) (discussing re-
cent work by Clayton Christensen and others on why established firms are unlikely to pursue
disruptive innovation). Carrier and many others have also discussed the manner in which dis-
ruptive technologies can threaten the business models not only of incumbent technologists but
also of adjunct industries, such as purveyors of copyrighted material. Like incumbent technolo-
gists, well-financed copyright holders are likely to have disproportionate influence over regula-
tory processes.
42 See ZOLTAN Acs & DAVID AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 12-23 (1990);
DAVID AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND INDUSTRY EVOLUTION 35-38 (1995).
43 Economists routinely use such forward citations as a measure of patent value and have
shown that such forward citations are positively correlated to the market value of the firms that
own the underlying patents. See generally, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel
Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16 (2005). However, one
difficulty with these studies is that private value may diverge from social value. A patent may be
privately valuable because it purports to cover a fair amount of inventive territory but nonethe-
less of suspect validity given the prior invention (and unlikely to be challenged in litigation be-
cause of various well-rehearsed market failures associated with challenging patents, see Joseph
Farrell & Robert Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reli-
ably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 943, 951-60 (2004); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards
for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 667, 668-77 (2004).
44 CHI RESEARCH, INC., SMALL SERIAL INNOVATORS: THE SMALL FIRM CONTRIBUTION
TO TECHNICAL CHANGE 11-12 (2003), available at http://sba.gov/advo/research/rs225tot.pdf. Of
course, there are many noteworthy exceptions, even within biotechnology and information tech-
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cumbents are generally better organized and have more lobbying
clout than upstarts. Certainly they are better organized than the highly
decentralized innovators that engage in what economist Eric von Hip-
pel has called "user innovation. ' '45
Our innovation policy is thus heavily influenced by firms that re-
present only one portion of the innovation ecosystem. While large
firms clearly have an important role, they should not be the only play-
ers at the policymaking table.
II. The Importance of Institutional Structure
When legal scholars and economists who study innovation speak
of institutions, they often mean particular types of innovation incen-
tives-market competition, imperfect competition through such
mechanisms as lead time or patents, government funding, and the
like. 46 Here, by contrast, we envision institutions as the mix of courts,
agencies, and legislatures that make up the regulatory state. The deci-
sions that must be made in allocating power within the latter set of
institutions are procedural, not substantive. But because procedure
and substance are intimately related, different structures will make
different sorts of substantive policies easier or harder to implement.
So institutional choices should reflect substantive policy priorities-or
at least not place huge hurdles before them.
A. The Nature of the Review
Before we can discuss the institutional structure of innovation
policy formation, we need to outline what such policy formation
would entail. We will return to this issue in fleshing out our proposal
for an innovation regulator, and objections to it, but it makes sense to
provide a concrete example now, as a way of bringing the institutional
considerations to the fore.
Consider the recurrent debate among legal scholars and eco-
nomic analysts over how technology platforms-that is, basic or in-
frastructural innovation that is difficult to invent around and can serve
as the basis for much future innovation-should be regulated.4 7 Em-
nology, to the predominance of small firms. In some cases from an earlier era (e.g., Bell Labs), a
reliable flow of monopolistic or oligopolistic profits allowed for the funding of in-house labs that
produced breakthrough innovation.
45 See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005).
46 See generally SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004) (examining
innovation "institutions" such as patents, government funding, prizes, and the like).
47 See generally Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and
Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
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bedded within this inquiry is a host of complicated subsidiary
inquiries.
First, the regulator must make a threshold assessment of the de-
gree to which the innovation in question is in fact a platform technol-
ogy. In the case of certain types of invention-say embryonic stem
cells or the protocols that control how the Internet operates-the an-
swer may be relatively clear. In other situations, the answer may be
much less clear. For example, the Windows operating system is by no
means intrinsically a platform innovation. Many other operating sys-
tems could do the job. But operating systems are subject to network
effects that may make widespread adoption of a single operating sys-
tem standard a likely outcome.48 Thus the result may be an invention
that looks a lot like a platform.
Second, assuming that the regulator has determined that a given
innovation is in fact a platform technology, it must determine whether
the owner is likely to exploit that technology in a manner that is detri-
mental to innovation. Chicago-school economics teaches that if the
platform owner is not able optimally to deploy all of the available
improvements to the platform, it will maximize its profit by licensing
its platform to entities that have ideas regarding how to improve the
platform. The phrase often used to summarize this idea is that "there
is only one monopoly profit"-so a rational monopolist will charge a
profit-maximizing price for its input but happily allow competition in
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003) (discussing the role of internalizing complementary efficiencies in
the regulation of platform technologies). In the case of certain platform technologies (for exam-
ple, physical platforms like cable or logical platforms like Internet protocols), commentators
have been concerned not only about the deployment of further technological improvements but
also about the treatment of communication/content that is layered onto the platforms. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 19-25 (2001) (introducing an analysis of the manner in which content is layered onto the
Internet and its effect on innovation). Although content is not the focus of our Article, we
consider issues of content to the extent that they have an impact on innovation. For example, if
content providers are reluctant to license their content to particular innovators, or if content
regulators decide to mandate particular technologies to deter copying, those issues are central to
our analysis.
48 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Ef-
fects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 501 (1998) (noting that in the Microsoft case "[a]ll of the parties
seemed to acknowledge the role network effects played in Microsoft's dominance of the operat-
ing systems market"); Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons
from the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 93-95 (2001) (quoting the court in the Microsoft
case as finding that "consumer demand for Windows enjoys positive network effects" because
"[t]he fact that there is a multitude of people using Windows makes the product more attractive
to users"); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Net-
works, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 36 (stating that network externalities can arise when increas-
ing demand for a product "spurs the demand for and production of complementary products").
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related markets.49 On this understanding, transaction costs should be
the only impediment to the platform owner's "doing good and doing
well." Post-Chicago-school economics cautions, however, that there
are other exceptions to this principle of "internalizing complementary
externalities" upon which the Chicago school's optimistic vision re-
lies. 50 The regulator will have to determine whether these other ex-
ceptions (or, for that matter, transaction costs) will pose a problem in
any given case.
Third, assuming that the regulator is worried that the monopolist
will not optimally deploy its platform, it will have to determine
whether to act ex ante, before concrete problems have arisen, or ex
post. Acting ex ante may turn out to be unnecessary. Worse, if man-
dated access fees are set at suboptimal levels, the monopolist's incen-
tives to maintain or improve the platform (as well as incentives for
future monopolists to create new platforms) may be diminished. Con-
cerns about platform maintenance are less central when the platform
is purely informational in nature. But when the platform has a physi-
cal component-for example, cable networks that support broadband
access-the concern becomes more central. Mandated access may
also mean that future innovators have less incentive to create alterna-
tive platforms, particularly if they fear suboptimal compensation.
Government officials confront issues like this with some regular-
ity. A company or interest group petitions an agency, court, or Con-
gress to regulate a technology in a particular way, and the relevant
government entity chooses how to respond. The governmental re-
sponse may be based on a host of considerations, with no explicit fo-
cus on innovation. But the government's response will affect the
course of innovation, and thus constitutes, inter alia, innovation policy.
The point of the review we are suggesting is that there be an explicit
focus on innovation, with the sort of analysis we describe above. Ei-
ther way, the government is going to make a decision that affects in-
novation. Our suggestion is that its decisionmaking process include
careful, explicit attention to the effect of any decision on the course of
innovation.
49 See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUsT: CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 870 (2d ed. 1981).





If a major substantive priority is innovation (as we argue it should
be), then institutions whose actions can affect innovation should be
acutely cognizant of the impact that they have. In that regard, the
policy apparatus in agencies, Congress, and the courts leaves much to
be desired.
Consider the patent system. Economists and legal analysts have
long noted that patents can have both beneficial and deleterious ef-
fects on innovation.5 1 While patents do provide incentives for innova-
tion, they can also be used to block the efforts of follow-on
innovators. Thus, on the standard account, the critical issue involves
maintaining a delicate balance between what lies within, and outside,
the patent system.
For much of its existence, the Federal Circuit has tended to ig-
nore this standard account, as well as empirical data indicating that for
large manufacturing firms patents are important for securing returns
to innovation primarily in the chemical/pharmaceutical and medical
equipment industries. 52 In fact, prior to the Supreme Court's recent
interventions in the area of patents, the Federal Circuit had made de-
fending a patent against charges of invalidity significantly easier.5 3
The behavior of the Federal Circuit was arguably consistent with stan-
dard accounts of capture of regulatory processes by well-represented
interest groups.5 4 In this case, the most salient interest group is patent
51 See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37-39 (1991); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 2, at
1-7, 17-36 (2003), available at www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
52 See Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, supra note 3, at 9 (reporting survey results in which re-
search and development managers stated that patents were effective in protecting over 50% of
product innovations only in the drug and medical equipment industries). The study's data were
limited to large manufacturing firms in the United States. See id. at 5. Patents may play a role in
securing returns and venture capital investment for smaller firms in industries not related to
medicine, but the data on this issue are sparse.
53 See, e.g., Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit's Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114-15 (2006); Glynn S. Lunney,
Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 Sup. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 16 (2004). To be sure, these studies also suggest that the Federal Circuit may be more
likely than its predecessors to read patents narrowly and hence find them not infringed in any
given case. See Henry & Turner, supra, at 90; Lunney, supra, at 15-16. However, in contrast to a
patent that is found invalid, a patent that is found not to be infringed in a particular case is not
taken out of the system and can still be asserted against other parties.
54 See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971) (providing an analysis of how the political process is used by certain small
groups to improve their economic status).
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lawyers-although patent lawyers do represent both patentees and al-
leged infringers, they have an obvious interest in the maintenance of a
relatively robust patent system.55
As we have noted, the system's "pro-patent" tendencies have re-
cently been mitigated through Supreme Court intervention in several
important cases.56 But such intervention is by nature selective. It re-
mains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will provide a perma-
nent safeguard against the tendency of the Federal Circuit to favor
patents and to view patents as an exception to ordinary legal rules.
Perhaps even more problematic, particularly in the face of the
broad, open-ended language of the patent statutes,57 is the disavowal
of explicit policy analysis by the Federal Circuit.58 As a consequence
of this disavowal, the patent system has embraced software patents of
broad and often unclear scope without considering the patent thickets
that such allowance would create for the highly cumulative process of
software development.5 9 In contrast, patent scope with respect to
genes has been relatively narrow even though a broader scope would
arguably be more aligned with development goals, at least with re-
spect to genes that cover therapeutic proteins.60
55 See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSHUA LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT (2004).
56 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740-41 (2007) (heightening the
required showing for an invention to be "non-obvious" and therefore patentable); Medimmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007) (holding that a licensee is not required to
terminate its licensing agreement in order to have standing to challenge the validity of the patent
upon which the agreement is based); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94
(2006) (holding that permanent injunctive relief is not always warranted even after a patent has
been found valid and infringed).
57 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (requiring that a patentable invention be "new and
useful"); id. § 103 (requiring that a patentable invention be "nonobvious").
58 The historically "pro-patent" position of the Federal Circuit of course represented an
implicit policy stance. However, this position almost always emerged from formal reasoning
regarding what the patent statute purportedly "required." The Federal Circuit has stated that
"public policy" arguments regarding the requirements of the patent system "are more appropri-
ately directed to Congress as the legislative branch of government." In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Meanwhile, the PTO (unlike the European Patent Office) has no econo-
mists or analysts with advanced training in social science on its staff. Cf. Letter from Edward J.
Black, President & CEO, Computer & Commc'ns Indus. Ass'n, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman,
U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ccianet.orgldocsl
patent/Patent-ltrLeahy.pdf (proposing to remedy this deficiency by establishing an Institute for
Innovation, Economics, and Patent Policy within the PTO).
59 See, e.g., Lemley & McGowan, supra note 48, at 524 n.195 and accompanying text;
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 187-214 (2008).
60 Rai, supra note 9, at 1072-73 & n.167 (arguing that narrow patent scope in this area
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In addition to the PTO and the Federal Circuit, the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") plays a very important role in the for-
mulation of innovation policy with respect to drugs and therapeutic
proteins. 61 There is reason to believe the FDA could do a better job.
Important recent work on the FDA suggests that there may be consid-
erable innovation advantages associated with drug safety reform that
focuses not on increasing preapproval clinical testing requirements
(the FDA's typical focus) but instead on improving manufacturers'
postmarketing efforts to identify safety problems.62
Additionally, when they actually focus on innovation, govern-
ment institutions like agencies and courts regulate innovation without
having much awareness of what other institutions, faced with similar
problems, have done.63 Such awareness could be tremendously help-
ful. For example, the economic questions raised by platform-based
innovation share tremendous similarities, no matter the science be-
hind the platform or the specific application to which it is put. For any
platform innovation, broad basic questions arise about how to ensure
that the innovation arises and is disseminated, how the creators should
be compensated, and whether creators of an innovation platform have
the incentive and ability to dominate related markets. 64 All of these
inquiries feed into the ultimate question of the degree to which the
government should regulate and/or subsidize either the innovation or
its related markets.
When, for example, the PTO or the Federal Circuit makes a deci-
sion regarding how to treat extremely broad claims in a patent on em-
bryonic stem cells (a trio of such broad patents was granted and
allows rivals to "invent around" a particular therapeutic protein patent, "severely undermin[ing]
the patentee's return on its R&D investment"). It should be noted, though, that in the context
of genes that cover therapeutic proteins, the narrow scope afforded gene patents has been miti-
gated by the reality that FDA approval represents a significant barrier to entry for those who
would compete with patented proteins. As matters currently stand, there is no regime for mak-
ing generic therapeutic proteins.
61 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. Rev. 345, 347 (2007) ("FDA regulation has also become an important
adjunct to the patent system in protecting innovating firms from competition in product
markets.").
62 Shelby D. Reed, Robert M. Califf & Kevin A. Schulman, How Changes in Drug-Safety
Regulation Affect the Way Drug and Biotech Companies Invest in Innovation, 25 HEALTH AFF.
1309, 1313 (2006).
63 See infra text accompanying notes 75-92.
64 See generally Farrell & Weiser, supra note 47 (discussing these issues); Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 100-05 (1994)
(discussing market responses to the problems of network effects).
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subsequently challenged), 65 it might consider lessons learned by Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC") regulators that have con-
sidered the issue of property rights over (or compelled access to)
platforms. The debates about the viability and contours of an essen-
tial facilities doctrine could help to inform a decisionmaker at the Na-
tional Institutes of Health ("NIH") faced with the question of whether
to declare that no patent rights should be sought on a particular gen-
ome sequencing project. 66
And platform technologies do not represent the only area where
multiple agencies are likely to have important arguments that other
agencies should be listening to. For example, the 2003 FTC report
suggesting mechanisms for improvement of the patent system was mo-
tivated by the proposition that issues of competition policy and inno-
vation policy overlap. 67 More fundamentally, every new area of
technology represents another venue for deciding whether competi-
tion or quasi-monopoly rights is the best mechanism for promoting
innovation.
At the same time we see convergence of economic analysis, we
also see technological convergence. The so-called "minimal genome"
that synthetic biologists seek to develop (and on which Craig Venter
has recently sought a patent) could be used in a wide variety of indus-
tries, ranging from clean energy to pharmaceuticals. 68 Currently, in-
65 Andrew Pollack, Agency Agrees to Review Human Stem Cell Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2006, at C3.
66 See Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doc-
trine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 453 (2002) (arguing that there is no
reason why the essential facilities doctrine could not apply to assets protected by intellectual
property laws just as some courts have applied them to undisputed natural monopolies such as
utilities); Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Prop-
erty: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between IP and Other Property Rights, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 741, 761-62 (2004) (suggesting that in the context of unilateral refusals to
deal, the essential facilities doctrine should apply to intellectual property cases just as it does to
tangible property cases). See generally Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) ("We have never recognized [an essential facilities] doc-
trine, and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here. It suffices for present
purposes to note that the indispensable requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailabil-
ity of access to the 'essential facilities;' where access exists, the doctrine serves no purpose.")
(citations omitted); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1187 (1999) (arguing that there are relatively few situations in which the essential facilities
doctrine makes sense); Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facili-
ties, 75 ArTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008) (arguing, as the title suggests, for a revitalized essential facilities
doctrine).
67 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COM-
PETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY passim (2003).
68 See generally Jocelyn Kaiser, Attempt to Patent Artificial Organism Draws a Protest, 316
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novation in energy and pharmaceuticals is regulated by a large
number of different players, ranging from the NIH and the FDA
(pharmaceuticals)69 to the Department of Energy and the EPA
(energy).70
Similarly, with the abolition of the Office of Technology Assess-
ment ("OTA") in the mid-1990s, the ability of Congress to secure un-
biased advice on questions of innovation policy is limited. 71 Even with
such unbiased advice, moreover, it is not clear that Congress would be
capable of acting in a systematic manner with respect to innovation.72
The America COMPETES Act is a positive sign. On the other hand,
the current stalemate over patent reform legislation-in which the
range of possible options appears limited to those supported by large
information technology players on the one hand and those supported
by biopharmaceutical companies and patent lawyers on the other-
represents a classic failure of collective action on the part of the many
other constituencies that are also affected by the patent system. 73
Additionally, government agencies often fail to coordinate inno-
vation policy, resulting in incoherence and perhaps bald inconsistency.
For example, the PTO has insinuated itself into the middle of complex
questions involving the regulation of "Voice over Internet Protocol"
("VoIP") telephony by granting broad and possibly invalid patents
over key elements of such telephony to a number of large incumbent
providers, including Verizon, Sprint, and AT&T. The PTO almost as-
suredly had no particular intention to regulate the battle over VoIP.
To the contrary, thinking about VoIP has been the province of the
Sci. 1557 (2007) (discussing Venter's quest to patent an entirely synthetic free-living organism
and the controversy it has stirred).
69 The FDA regulates the approval, labeling, and manufacture of pharmaceutical products,
while the NIH funds biopharmaceutical research. See Sheila R. Shulman & Andrea Kuettel,
Drug Development and the Public Health Mission: Collaborative Challenges at the FDA, NIH,
and Academic Medical Centers, 53 Bun'. L. REV. 663, 664-91 (2005).
70 The Department of Energy directs and funds energy-related scientific research and reg-
ulates the nation's energy resources, infrastructure, and efficiency standards. See Department of
Energy, Program Offices, http:/lwww.energy.govlorganizationlprogram-offices.htm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2008). The EPA regulates the environmental effects of energy production and con-
sumption. See Peter M. Crofton, Emerging Issues Relating to the Burgeoning Hydrogen Econ-
omy, 27 ENERGY L.J. 39, 51 (2006) (describing the EPA's role in the regulation of energy).
71 See infra text accompanying notes 190-97 (discussing the history of OTA).
72 See infra Part III.B.2.
73 Stuart Benjamin & Arti Rai, A Tale of Two Bills: Good Innovation Policy Goes Beyond
Interest Group Politics, SC. PROGRESS, Nov. 6, 2007, available at http://www.scienceprogress.org/
2007/11/a-tale-of-two-billslprint/ (lamenting that "absent from the debate [about the Patent Re-
form Act of 2007] is any group that looks at the whole innovation ecosystem, with a view toward
advancing overall social welfare").
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FCC, which views it as a valuable alternative to local landline teleph-
ony.74 But the PTO's issuance of broad patents has allowed Verizon
and other incumbent providers to pursue via government-granted
property rights what they have been unable to achieve via FCC regu-
lation. They have filed patent suits that have called into serious ques-
tion the survival of a much smaller start-up, Vonage, that has
implemented VoIP successfully. 75
To be sure, if the incumbents' patents are in fact valid,76 then
some payment to Verizon and other incumbents is appropriate. But
the threatened remedy of injunctive relief (in the shadow of which
VoIP providers have settled the various lawsuits for large sums of
money) conflicts with FCC policy. 77
While the PTO's intervention with respect to VoIP was largely
inadvertent, in some situations the failure to coordinate some aspect
of innovation policy flows from the agencies' conflicting agendas. This
problem has arisen in spectrum policy. Although innovation in wire-
less services depends on the availability of radio frequencies, the man-
agement of these frequencies has been characterized by difficulties
arising from the involvement of different agencies with competing
goals. One might imagine that conflicts would arise between the FCC
(which manages commercial spectrum) and the National Telecommu-
nications and Information Administration ("NTIA") (which manages
the spectrum assigned to the government). These two agencies have
indeed differed on spectrum policy. But the conflicts between those
two agencies and the Department of Defense (the largest government
user of spectrum) have been more notable and pitched. 78 The Depart-
74 See IP-Enabled Servs., 19 F.C.C.R. 4863, 4864-68 (2004) ("[T]he changes wrought by
the rise of IP-enabled communications [including VolP] promise to be revolutionary ... to re-
duce the cost of communication and to spur innovation and individualization.").
75 See Vonage Settles Suit by Verizon, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2007, at D03 (discussing settle-
ment between Vonage and Verizon estimated at $120 million); Laura M. Holson, A Settlement by
Vonage Over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at C1 (same).
76 The issue of appropriate validity standards is itself, of course, a policy question. As
discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 52-57, the Federal Circuit's liberalization of
validity standards has elicited much negative commentary and has prompted Supreme Court
intervention.
77 A vast amount of economic literature documents how the potential for hold-up created
by injunctive relief allows patent holders to extract more in licensing fees and/or settlements
than the actual contribution made by their patents.
78 See, e.g., Lynnette Luna, Spectrum Quandary puts 3G at Risk, TELEPHONY, July 23,
2001, at 10 (discussing tensions among the FCC, NTIA, and Department of Defense on spectrum
policy); Kendra Wall, Splitting the Spectrum, UPSIDE, Sept. 2001, at 82 (same); BENJAMIN ET AL.,
TELECOMMJNICATIONS LAW AND POuc' 51-60 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the FCC's and NTIA's
roles in spectrum regulation).
[Vol. 77:1
Fixing Innovation Policy
ment of Defense resisted spectrum liberalization proposals put for-
ward in the late-1990s and 2000, and it successfully thwarted attempts
at revamping its spectrum allocations. 79 Top spectrum officials agree
that "the FCC, NTIA and Congress have created a bureaucratic mo-
rass of [spectrum] regulations and oversight that impedes progress."80
Given the specific missions of each agency, it is not surprising that
there are both regulatory overlaps and regulatory lacunae. Both phe-
nomena can lead to lack of coordination and inefficiency, as agencies
often take actions in tension with those of another agency (in the case
of overlaps) or take actions that are outside their core area of exper-
tise and in the process do a poor job. An example of the former is the
multiple agency jurisdiction over telecommunications mergers, which
are reviewed by the FCC as well as the DOJ Antitrust Division and
the FTC. Those agencies often apply different standards and often
reach differing results (for purposes of innovation and otherwise),
leading to much wasted effort for regulators and the regulated parties.
An example of a regulatory lacuna is the FCC's attempt at pro-
tecting television producers' copyrights via "broadcast flags." Content
owners expressed fears about unauthorized sharing of their program-
ming once such programming became digital, and they lobbied the
FCC to require devices capable of receiving digital television signals
to recognize the copy-control mechanism (known as a "broadcast
flag") created by content producers. The FCC had little background
or expertise in matters of copyright and copy control, and indeed it
had no obvious jurisdiction: Congress never saw fit to give the FCC
authority over consumers' use of television receivers after the comple-
tion of a broadcast transmission.81 But content producers correctly
thought the FCC would be sympathetic to their concerns, and as a
result, the FCC mandated the broadcast flag, resting not on any ex-
plicit grant of jurisdiction over copying or copyright but instead on its
"ancillary jurisdiction. '82 The United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC's order as beyond its jurisdiction, but
beyond the jurisdictional problem there was good reason to doubt the
79 See, e.g., Kevin C. Darrenkamp, The Military Battles for Electromagnetic Spectrum Su-
periority, ARmy LAw., July 2000, at 34, 37-38 (discussing the battle between the Department of
Defense and the NTIA and FCC, and fearing that "the NTIA and the FCC [will] attempt to re-
open the DOD's old wounds" on spectrum).
80 Bob Brewin, Cellular Carriers, DOD Debate Spectrum Needs, COMPUTERWORLD, April
8, 2002, at 61.
81 Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
82 See Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18 F.C.C.R. 23,550, 23,563-64 (2003), vacated in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Am. Library Ass'n, 406 F.3d at 708.
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wisdom of the FCC's approach.83 The broadcast flag responded to a
problem that had not yet arisen by imposing significant restrictions on
the architecture of consumer equipment and thereby making legal
copying and use more difficult. The FCC had regulated outside its
area of core expertise at the behest of a politically powerful constitu-
ency who feared that otherwise their concerns would go unheeded,
and the result was an unlawful and probably unwise regulatory
venture.
In other cases, the organic statutes enacted by Congress explicitly
create tensions between agencies. For example, as matters currently
stand, patents are interpreted not simply by the PTO (and the courts
that review the PTO) but also by the ITC. While the PTO interprets
patent applications and patents under the Patent Act,84 the ITC inter-
prets patents in the context of its own organic statute, the Tariff Act.85
Under section 1337 of the Tariff Act, the ITC can block imported arti-
cles that infringe U.S. patents held by domestic industries.86 Moreo-
ver, according to the ITC, because it has a different source of
statutory authority, it is not always bound by the patent interpreta-
tions that the PTO and the courts develop when they interpret the
Patent Act.8 7 To the contrary, the ITC claims it should receive Chev-
ron deference even when its interpretations diverge from those that
might be rendered under the Patent Act.8 8 The ITC's argument has
been accepted by the very court, the Federal Circuit, that reviews the
PTO.s 9
Perhaps the most interesting part of the ITC argument is that, at
least as a formal legal matter, it is plausible. As Sapna Kumar has
argued, when Congress transformed the relatively weak Tariff Com-
mission into the ITC as part of the Tariff Act revisions enunciated in
83 Am. Library Ass'n, 406 F.3d at 708.
84 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
85 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1654
(2006)).
86 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
87 See Kinik Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting the
ITC's belief that recently enacted defenses to infringement in the Patent Act do not apply to
infringement actions before the ITC).
88 See id. at 1363 (finding that the ITC is entitled to Chevron deference in its belief that
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the Trade Act of 1974,90 it was motivated in part by a protectionist
agenda that is distinct from the innovation-focused agenda of the Pat-
ent Act.91 Under this agenda (and subsequent legislation that tends to
reinforce this agenda), Congress has indicated that it wants issues such
as defenses to patent infringement and the availability of injunctive
relief to be viewed differently under the Tariff Act than they are
under the Patent Act. As a policy matter, however, the unfortunate
result is forum shopping and other attempts at gaming by domestic
industry patentees. 92
C. The Limitations of Current Efforts at Agency Review
To the many scholars who have studied the last twenty-five years
of presidential efforts to exercise greater centralized control of agency
action,93 some of the pathologies discussed in the prior section will
have a familiar ring. These efforts have typically been promoted as
attempts to counter agency parochialism and to harmonize conflicts
90 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 171, 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2231 (2006)).
91 See generally Sapna Kumar, Irreconcilable Differences: The Role of the ITC in Patent
Decisions (Duke Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 107, 2008), available at http://
Isr.nellco.org/duke/fs/papers/107/.
92 For example, Broadcom Corporation recently brought patent infringement claims
against Qualcomm in both federal district court and before the ITC. See Judge Sides with
Broadcom in Qualcomm Patent Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/08/11/business/llbroadcom.html. The ITC found that Qualcomm had in
fact infringed on Broadcom's patent for certain computer chips used in mobile phones, and
granted Broadcom's requested relief of a ban on the importation of mobile phones using the
most recent Qualcomm chips. See id. In contrast with the ITC, which must grant injunctive
relief if it finds infringement of a valid patent, district courts may exercise discretion over
whether to grant injunctive relief.
93 For generally favorable analyses, see, for example, Steven Croley, White House Review
of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 873-85 (2003) (find-
ing, based on review of OIRA rulemaking documents, that White House does not favor narrow
interests); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2383-84 (2001)
(arguing that an increased presidential role in regulation "both satisfies legal requirements and
promotes the values of administrative accountability and effectiveness"); Lawrence Lessig &
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105-06 (1994)
("[B]ecause the President has a national constituency-unlike relevant members of Congress,
who oversee independent agencies with often parochial agendas-it appears to operate as an
important counterweight to factional influence over administration."); Christopher C. DeMuth
& Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075,
1076-82 (1986). For less favorable reviews, see, for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael
P. Vanderbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential
Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 48 (2006); William D. Araiza, Judicial and Legislative Checks on
Ex Parte OMB Influence over Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 613-15 (2002) (noting that
OMB review has raised concern about "the executive acting as a confidential partner of and
conduit for regulated parties seeking to influence agency action").
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between agencies, particularly in the areas of health, safety, and envi-
ronmental regulation. 94 To what extent could current mechanisms of
centralized review provide a coordinated set of innovation-friendly
policies (at least in those cases where the inconsistency is not created
by Congress, and courts do not act at cross-purposes with such
coordination)?
The most systematic mechanism through which greater presiden-
tial control has been pursued is a series of executive orders imposing
the somewhat controversial requirement that agencies conduct cost-
benefit analyses of major regulations. Centralized review of these
analyses is then conducted by OIRA, an office within the OMB.95
OIRA review began with the Reagan Administration and has contin-
ued in some form through the current Bush Administration.96 The
details of this review have varied somewhat depending on the admin-
istration-for example, the Clinton years introduced greater trans-
parency into the OIRA process by requiring, inter alia, public
disclosure of all communications between OIRA personnel and indi-
viduals not employed by the executive branch.97 But the basic princi-
ples have remained the same. To the extent that OIRA finds a
94 For a strong statement along these lines by two Reagan-era White House officials, see
DeMuth & Ginsberg, supra note 93, at 1081 ("Centralized review of proposed regulations.., by
an office that has no program responsibilities and is accountable only to the president, is an
appropriate response to the failings of regulation [because it] encourages policy coordination,
greater political accountability, and more balanced regulatory decisions."). Although the De-
Muth and Ginsberg article is nonempirical in nature, a number of prominent empirical studies
have argued that agency regulation in the area of health, safety, and the environment is haphaz-
ard and inconsistent, and routinely fails to maximize net benefits. See, e.g., Tammy 0. Tengs &
John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Saving, in
RisKs, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 167, 167-68 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996). But see Richard
Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1350-57 (2003) (criticizing the study
done by Tengs and Graham, among others, as being full of methodological flaws).
95 See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,498 pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 638 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000). The executive orders specify, however, that their requirements cannot be inconsistent
with any obligations in the organic statute. Thus, in the relatively unusual case where the or-
ganic statute forbids cost-benefit analysis, such analysis is not required.
For general background on OIRA, see Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB3. L.J. 1257, 1257 (2006);
Office of Management and Budget, OMB Organization Chart, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
omb-org-chart.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
96 See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1985); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed.
Reg. 2763, 2763-65 (Jan. 18, 2007).
97 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(B)-(C), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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"significant" regulation 98 inconsistent with its cost-benefit analysis, it
can return the regulation to the agency (which can then revise or with-
draw it). Although OIRA's analysis does not always trump that of the
agency, it does dominate. Lower-level disputes between OIRA staff
and staff at the rulemaking agency are resolved by the OIRA Admin-
istrator.99 Only if an agency head disagrees with the Administrator of
OIRA is there a real fight-in that case, the OMB Director or the
agency head brings the dispute to the attention of the President, who
is responsible for its resolution.100 OIRA is staffed by career policy
analysts with various types of social science expertise. 1 1 Its only polit-
ical appointee is the OIRA Administrator.10 2
Proponents of OIRA review might argue innovation-related ben-
efits and costs can, and should, be addressed as part of the more gen-
eral cost-benefit review done by OIRA. In support of this argument,
they might note that although existing executive orders require agen-
cies to engage in a variety of specialized analyses (addressing, inter
alia, the impact of their regulations on the environment and on small
businesses), °3 agencies often fail to perform those analyses.104 They
might further contend that putting innovation into the global cost-
benefit analysis is not only more parsimonious but also quite possibly
preferable as a normative matter: specifically, because innovation is
not the only value that regulation may seek to promote, putting inno-
98 Significant regulations include regulations that have an annual effect on the economy of
more than $100 million or that create inconsistencies with the work of other agencies. Id. § 3. In
January 2007, the Bush Administration extended OIRA's purview to include not just rulemaking
but also "guidance documents"-manuals, memoranda, interpretive documents and the like.
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007). However, OIRA's analysis of these
guidance documents (even "significant" guidance documents that have an estimated impact of
$100 million or more on the economy) is much more limited than its analysis of regulations.
99 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1993).
100 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), amended by Exec.
Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9385 (Feb. 26, 2002).
101 See Office of Management and Budget, The Staff of the Office of Management and
Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/recruitmentlstaff.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2008)
("Over ninety percent of the [OMB] staff hold career, rather than political, appointments. Over
seventy percent of the staff are professionals, most with graduate degrees in economics, business
and accounting, public administration and policy, law, engineering, and other disciplines.").
102 See Croley, supra note 93, at 873-74.
103 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis 43-44 (Sept. 17,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/aOO4/a-4.pdf [hereinafter Circular
A-4] (discussing statutes and executive orders that require these specialized analyses).
104 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737, 782-86
(2004) (discussing agencies' failure to engage in the analysis of their rules' impact on federalism
as required by executive order); see also infra text accompanying notes 237-38, 245-47.
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vation into the larger context of an overall cost-benefit analysis is af-
firmatively desirable.
We agree that innovation-related impacts can, and should, ulti-
mately be folded into a larger cost-benefit analysis.105 But that does
not necessarily mean that analysts within OIRA itself are best suited
for providing guidance about, or reviewing, the "innovation module"
of the larger cost-benefit analysis. Nor does it mean that OIRA ana-
lysts will be sufficiently motivated to prompt agencies to think about
innovation impacts or to rationalize conflicting policies on innovation.
Assessing the suitability of OIRA for promoting coherent inno-
vation policy requires an initial assessment of whether OIRA has, in
general, promoted regulatory coherence (as its proponents argue) or,
instead, has been secretive, biased against regulation, and subject to
its own interest groups and political pressures (as its detractors con-
tend). Qualitative arguments for and against OIRA review have re-
cently been supplemented by more systematic empirical analysis.
Steven Croley argues, based upon an analysis of OIRA decisionmak-
ing focused largely on the Clinton years, that "White House review
appears to be at least partially technocratic and at any rate not ad
hoc. '10 6 Croley further concludes that although OIRA meetings on
rules (which can be requested by an interested party) do tend to be
attended by narrowly focused interest groups, the type of interest
group in attendance at a meeting did not predict whether a rule was
changed.107
Although Croley's study provides some empirical insight, it is
limited by the fact that it cannot take into account the magnitude or
direction of rule change. In the OIRA coding scheme, even stylistic
modifications appear as a rule change. Lisa Bressman and Michael
Vanderbergh's recent survey of top EPA officials in the George H.W.
Bush and Clinton Administrations suggests a less sanguine picture. 10 8
105 Defending cost-benefit analysis itself is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to
say that we are persuaded by those who argue that, despite its limitations and potential for
improvement (particularly with respect to addressing distributional concerns and commensurat-
ing diverse costs and benefits), cost-benefit analysis is the most promising tool for rational analy-
sis of regulatory action. For helpful discussions of how cost-benefit analysis works, and how it
could be improved, see generally, for example, MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW
FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); see also Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sun-
stein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?: Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1522-23 (2002).
106 Croley, supra note 93, at 873.
107 Id. at 874.
108 Bressman & Vanderbergh, supra note 93, at 75. The Bressman and Vanderbergh survey
asked EPA officials questions not only about OIRA but also about the involvement of White
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EPA officials in both Administrations reported that OIRA's selection
of regulations for close scrutiny was in fact somewhat ad hoc, even
with respect to those economically significant rulemakings with im-
pacts of $100 million or more that both the Reagan/Bush- and Clin-
ton-era executive orders single out as a focus for OIRA. 1°9
Additionally, according to EPA officials, OIRA was often subject to
influence by other White House offices, particularly in cases involving
"high-profile or high-stakes issues." 110 According to Bressman and
Vandenbergh, OIRA also focused "almost exclusively on the cost side
of the cost-benefit analysis" and "consistently sought changes that re-
laxed burdens on regulated entities." '
A 2003 study by the Government Accountability Office
("GAO") (highlighted in a recent critique of OIRA by Nicholas Bag-
ley and Richard Revesz) also suggests an antiregulatory tilt, at least in
the early years of the George W. Bush Administration. 112 This report
investigated eighty-five economically significant health, safety, or en-
vironmental rules that OIRA had caused to be changed, returned, or
withdrawn during the period from July 2001 through June 2002.113
The GAO determined that twenty-five of these rules had been sub-
stantially affected by the OIRA process-seventeen had been "signifi-
cantly changed," seven returned to the agency for reconsideration,
and one withdrawn at OIRA's request.114 Fourteen of the seventeen
rules that were significantly changed came from the EPA.115 In six of
the fourteen cases, the primary effect was to delay or eliminate regula-
tion.11 6 In four others, OIRA suggestions led the agency to adopt
"more flexible and/or less costly compliance options to regulated
entities." 117
House offices other than OIRA. Id. at 76. For purposes of our discussion, only the specific
questions about OIRA are directly relevant.
109 See id. at 67.
110 Id. at 69.
111 Id. at 74-75.
112 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, OMB and the Centralized Review of Regula-
tion, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1269-70 (2006).
113 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGEN-
CIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 5 (2003) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT]. These eighty-five, which represented a subset of about 400 draft rules that had been
changed, returned, or withdrawn during that period, had been submitted by the nine health,
safety, or environmental agencies with five or more such rules. Id.
114 Id. at 69.
115 Id. at 74.
116 Id. at 76.
117 See id. at 77; see also David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 335, 379-80 (2006) (reviewing the GAO report and arguing that OIRA review "never
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The GAO report also suggests that OIRA was influenced by, or
at least reached conclusions consistent with, arguments made by
outside parties, primarily regulated entities. In eleven of the twenty-
five cases where regulations were substantially affected, outside par-
ties had requested a meeting.1 8 In seven of the eleven cases, the
changes made to the regulations were similar to those suggested by
the outside parties.11 9
Of course, it may be that the health, safety, and environmental
agencies in question (and particularly the EPA, which is known for its
"mission focus")12 0 considered cost to regulated entities insufficiently
and that OIRA provided a useful counterweight.121 Moreover, in the
Bressman and Vanderbergh survey, the EPA respondents did give
OIRA generally good marks on interagency coordination. 22
However, even proponents of OIRA do not claim it has fully
achieved a system in which net regulatory benefits are maximized.123
In part, this is because OIRA has tended to be reactive and has gener-
ally failed to use cost-benefit analysis to spur agency action.124
moved in the direction of encouraging more stringent regulation than the agency would adopt on
its own, even when benefits outweighed costs").
118 GAO REPORT, supra note 113, at 89.
119 Id. at 90.
120 See Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the
Administrative State," 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2007). Katzen was the OIRA administra-
tor for much of the Clinton Administration.
121 Id. at 1505, 1507.
122 Id. at 1506.
123 See, e.g., id. at 1502 (an article by the Clinton-Administration OIRA administrator de-
fending OIRA involvement in rulemaking, but also acknowledging that it "could work better").
124 See Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 105, at 1522 ("One of our primary concerns is that no
institution in government has yet vindicated the hopes of those who believed that cost-benefit
analysis could be used to help promote better priority-setting, block senseless rules, and spur
agency action when justified."); see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 112, at 1277-80 (arguing
that, under the George W. Bush Administration, OIRA's issuance of "prompt letters" urging
agencies to take action was infrequent, not the focus of its attention, and did not reflect "consis-
tent attempts to push agencies to implement costly but beneficial regulations").
Some recent work by John Graham, the OIRA administrator from 2001-2006, emphasizes
four "pro-regulatory" initiatives with which OIRA was involved. John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe
& Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administra-
tion, 33 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 953, 995-96 (2006) (discussing FDA labeling of food for trans-fat
content; Department of Transportation standards for improving light-truck fuel economy; and
EPA regulations on controlling engine exhaust and reducing air pollution from coal-fired power
plants). Aspects of the coal pollution regulations, however, have been quite controversial; in any
event, the regulations have been struck down on statutory grounds by the D.C. Circuit. Perhaps
more notably for purposes of the OIRA evaluation process, the Department of Transportation
standards have been struck down by the Ninth Circuit as "arbitrary and capricious" because the
cost-benefit analysis on which they were based failed to take into account benefits from reduc-
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At a minimum, then, the verdict on OIRA is mixed. It is not an
office so well respected for its neutrality, thoroughness, and trans-
parency that it should necessarily perform the innovation component
of the cost-benefit calculation. In fact, current OIRA staff may be
particularly ill-equipped to look at innovation impacts. In the Bress-
man and Vanderbergh survey, EPA officials emphasized that the
OIRA staff focused on short-term costs and benefits.125 Almost by
definition, a focus on the short term is unlikely to incorporate innova-
tion-related costs and benefits. Such benefits and costs are likely to be
quite important in the many cases where regulation-such as perform-
ance standards capping the emission of pollutants or emission taxes-
will foster innovation in technologies that limit emissions.126
Similarly, although Circular A-4 (OIRA's most recent guidance
to regulatory agencies on how to do cost-benefit analysis) does men-
tion estimating regulatory benefits and costs "based on credible
changes in technology over time, ' 127 its discussion of this issue is very
sparse. For example, Circular A-4 does not give any sense of how
"credibility" should be gauged given the existing state of the techno-
logical art. The lack of guidance is striking given the substantial litera-
ture that models the economic effects of technical change, both under
the assumption that it is exogenous and that it is policy-induced.1 28
Nor does Circular A-4 discuss with any sophistication the costs
and benefits of alternative regulatory mechanisms for stimulating in-
novation. Its major contribution in this regard is a statement that reg-
ulatory performance standards are generally superior to engineering
or design standards because they "give regulated parties the flexibility
to achieve regulatory objectives in the most cost-effective way."'1 29 Al-
tions in greenhouse-gas emissions. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2008).
125 Bressman & Vanderbergh, supra note 93, at 73.
126 For example, Clean Air Act regulation led to the development of catalytic conversion
technology. See generally David Gerard & Lester B. Lave, Implementing Technology-Forcing
Policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive
Emissions Controls in the United States, 72 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 761
(2005) (arguing that the Clean Air Act spurred technological change in the area of automotive
emissions controls).
127 Circular A-4, supra note 103, at 37.
128 For example, one recent study finds that if we were limited to technologies available in
2005, the present-value cost of achieving stabilization of carbon dioxide at 550 parts per million
would be over $20 trillion greater than with expected developments in energy efficiency, hydro-
gen energy technologies, advanced bioenergy, and wind and solar technologies. J.A. Edmonds
et al., Global Energy Technology Strategy: Addressing Climate Change, College Park, MD: Joint
Global Change Research Institute (on file with authors).
129 Circular A-4, supra note 103, at 8; see also id. at 16 ("Within a command-and-control
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though this statement is correct as far as it goes, it does not make the
obvious point that performance standards are also superior because
they have the capacity to stimulate innovation. The failure to mention
this point may reflect a larger lack of concern with long-term innova-
tion effects.
Finally, OIRA's organizational role, which is limited to cost-ben-
efit analysis of major proposed regulations, is ill-suited for the more
varied roles that we would envision for our innovation regulator.
Many of the major government actors whose actions affect innovation
act primarily through adjudication (whether internal agency adjudica-
tion or judicial adjudication) rather than rulemaking. So while OIRA
could be a part of the centralized focus on innovation that we envi-
sion, it is by no means the only option, nor is it the best one.
III. Congress Versus Courts Versus Agencies
As our discussion in Part II has shown, inattention to innovation
has been a pervasive problem for all government institutions. The ob-
vious next question is whether, and how, these institutions could most
usefully be improved for purposes of generating better innovation
policy.
At the outset, three important points bear brief mention. First,
the inquiry is necessarily a comparative one. Absolute competence
(or at least competence relative to unregulated markets) is relevant in
determining whether we want any government institution regulating
in a given area. But once we have decided that government regulation
makes sense and/or is necessary, the relevant question is a choice
among institutions. Second, and relatedly, in conducting comparative
institutional analysis there is little benefit in positing a platonic deci-
sionmaker. Theorizing about an idealized institution that has an ex-
tremely low likelihood of ever materializing does not give us much
information about how we actually want to structure our government
decisions. It makes sense then to consider institutions that exist and
that realistically could exist-improved versions of existing institu-
tions or new institutions that have a real chance of being created.
Third, this institutional analysis should take into account the costs of
change. We are not writing on a blank slate. There are existing insti-
tutions, and changing existing relationships entails costs. This does
not mean that we must limit ourselves to small-bore changes. It
regulatory program, performance-based standards generally offer advantages over standards
specifying design, behavior, or manner of compliance.").
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merely means that we must balance costs versus benefits, and be real-
istic about what is achievable.
A. Congress Versus Courts Versus Agencies-General
Considerations
A fair amount has been written on the relative strengths and
weaknesses of administrative agencies, Congress, and federal
courts. 30  In broad outline, agencies and Congress generally have a
nontrivial advantage over courts in terms of the ability to draw upon
technical expertise. As to the former, one of the central rationales for
creating administrative agencies was that they would have greater ex-
pertise and focus than generalist legislatures or courts. 131  The idea
was to create expert agencies that would concentrate on a particular
area, and thereby bring technocratic rigor to the decisionmaking pro-
cess.132 Even if the head (or heads) of an agency is not an expert,
130 A major recent commentator on such comparative institutional analysis is Neil
Komesar. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITU-
TIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). His work does not focus on administra-
tive agencies, but he includes them among the institutions he considers. Others have focused
more specifically on legislatures versus courts. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LE-
GAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (comparing the capacities and role of legislatures and
courts); see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 22-67 (1977) (ex-
ploring areas of judicial incapacity to illuminate the performance of the courts when they under-
take the making of social policy); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First
Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 332-43 (2000) (engaging in a comparative analysis of the
legislature and the judiciary to determine what role deference should play for the courts in adju-
dicating disputes); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches, 83 GEO. L.J. 347,
348 (1994) (arguing that when legislatures and courts both interpret the Constitution, the princi-
ple of comparative institutional competence should determine how much deference to give the
other branch); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424-33 (1996) (discussing how academic
theory is coalescing around fine-grained comparative analyses of institutions); Cass R. Sunstein
& Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) (arguing
for a method of judicial interpretation that accounts for institutional capacities).
131 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 621
(1927) ("[T]he inquirer [into administrative law] must have a sympathetic understanding of the
major causes which led to the emergence of modern administrative law, and must be able to
move freely in the world of social and economic facts with which administrative law is largely
concerned.").
132 See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938) ("With the rise of
regulation, the need for expertness became dominant; for the art of regulating an industry re-
quires knowledge of the details of its operation, ability to shift requirements as the condition of
the industry may dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance of an emer-
gency, and the power through enforcement to realize conclusions as to policy."); Louis L. Jaffe,
James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 320-22 (1964) (agreeing
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agencies usually have large staffs and significant research capabili-
ties. 133 And agencies can request information from third parties (for
example, think tanks and academic societies) to supplement their in-
ternal expertise. Congress, similarly, has quite significant research ca-
pabilities and the ability to request information from informed third
parties. But Congress's staff is smaller than that of most significant
agencies, so it needs to rely on third parties more than agencies do.
And, of course, the members of Congress are generalists who are usu-
ally not steeped in any of the fields that they regulate.
These points-in particular, the smaller staffs in Congress and the
limited time members can devote to any given issue-give agencies an
advantage over Congress in terms of technical expertise. An even big-
ger contrast is between agencies and Congress, on one hand, and
courts, on the other. Courts have small staffs, and the vast majority of
the information judges receive is from self-selected interested par-
ties.134 As one of us has previously noted, "[j]udges can seek informa-
tion from disinterested parties, but such procedures are ad hoc and, in
part for that reason, fairly cumbersome. ' 135 Agencies (and, to a lesser
extent, Congress) thus generally have a greater ability than courts to
amass expertise and make decisions on complex, data-intensive
matters. 13
6
with Landis that specialization is a virtue of the administrative agency); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079 (1990) ("All this was changed
by the creation in the twentieth century of a massive administrative apparatus, which was of
course a self-conscious repudiation of regulation through the judiciary. For the twentieth cen-
tury reformers, courts lacked the flexibility, powers of coordination, initiative, democratic ac-
countability, and expertise necessary to deal with complex social problems.").
133 For example, the EPA operates more than a dozen research labs and employs more
than 8500 scientists, engineers, and policy analysts. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
About EPA, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm#whoweare (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
And the Department of Energy operates more than twenty research labs and employs more than
30,000 scientists and engineers. U.S. Department of Energy, Labs & Technology Centers, http://
www.doe.gov/organization/labs-techcenters.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
134 See Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 169, 180-81 (1934) ("[Elven granting equality of counsel and intelligent presentation of
interests, the fact-finding equipment of the courts is woefully inadequate."); Kenneth Culp Da-
vis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the
Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court is often
inadequately staffed to develop the legislative facts needed to make its decisions).
135 See Benjamin, supra note 130, at 333-34.
136 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
972-75 (1992) ("[C]ourts are generalists, whereas agencies are specialists. Specialists usually
have a better grasp of technical terms or the practical consequences of a decision, and thus their
views should be given deference by generalists.").
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Advantages in competence that flow to agencies from specializa-
tion may, however, have other drawbacks. The agency might be so
narrowly focused that it develops tunnel vision-that is, it focuses on
benefiting its own sector of the economy even though the costs im-
posed on society more broadly may outweigh those benefits. 137 More
disturbingly, it may be biased, as a result of capture by narrow inter-
ests. This latter concern flows in significant part from the logic of col-
lective action 138-the idea that small groups of players with
concentrated interests will have an easier time organizing, and influ-
encing decisionmakers, than will large, diffuse groups. Concentrated
costs (or benefits) make for more effective action than do diffuse costs
(or benefits).1 39
Although many early capture theorists saw agencies as particu-
larly prone to capture by narrow interests, the rise of public choice
theory-which assumes that all government actors maximize, at least
in part, private goals to which narrow interests can cater-extends
concerns about the power of narrow interests to all government ac-
tors. 40 The idea is that powerful interests will do a good job of sup-
plying whatever it is that government actors seek, and so we would
expect those interests to prevail in whatever forum they appear. On
this theory, all government actors will be subject to capture, at least to
some degree.14 '
Indeed, notwithstanding its origins in the study of agency behav-
ior, capture appears particularly relevant for Congress. Classic quid
pro quo capture requires that the captured government actor wants
137 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 11 (1994) ("Tunnel vision, a classic administrative disease, arises when an agency
so organizes or subdivides its tasks that each employee's individual conscientious performance
effectively carries single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point where it brings
about more harm than good.").
138 The phrase "collective action" comes from the book of the same title. See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
139 Id. at 53-57, 132-34.
140 Some suggest that public actors are motivated solely (or at least very heavily) by their
private interests. See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 455, 456-58 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997)
("[B]ureaucracy can be well understood and a powerful theory someday constructed by assum-
ing bureaucrats are rational actors largely motivated by self-interest."); Roger G. Noll, Eco-
nomic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
1253, 1262-63 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (arguing that in the absence
of adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, public actors carry out policies that do
not reflect the interests of citizens).
141 See Noll, supra note 140, at 1264-66.
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something from the powerful interest that she is regulating, but it is
not obvious what that would be for an agency head: commentators
have suggested bigger budgets (but the rewards to the agency head
from a bigger budget may be more psychological than material), or
promises of jobs in the future with the relevant industry (but agency
heads will often have good job prospects simply by virtue of their ser-
vice as agency head, whether or not they cater to the interests of the
powerful), or some form of compensation (but there is relatively little
legal compensation that agency heads can accept, and illegal compen-
sation creates the risk of jail time).142 With respect to members of
Congress, though, the quid pro quo is fairly straightforward: elected
officials want campaign contributions, and powerful interests are in a
position to help deliver them. And, not surprisingly, many commenta-
tors now believe that Congress is particularly subject to quid pro quo
influence by powerful incumbent interests. 143
On the other hand, as the work of Neil Komesar and others illus-
trates, concerns about government actors being captured by narrow
interests are not limited to those who accept the motivational presup-
positions of public choice. 144 Even for those who are agnostic about
motivation, or believe that government actors pursue public-regarding
objectives, 145 the problem of "informational capture" is relevant.
142 Compare WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 114 (1971) ("[T]he coterminous relation of a bureaucrat's rewards and his position implies
that a bureaucrat will maximize the total budget of his bureau .... "), with KENNETH J. MEIER,
REGULATION: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMICS 14 (1985) (arguing that agency offi-
cials are not driven by simple desire to maximize their incomes, because their incomes would
generally be higher in the private sector), and JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT Gov-
ERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 118 (1989) ("One wonders why Niskanen thinks
bureaucrats are so desirous of maximizing their budgets if they can enjoy so few of the fruits."),
and Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV.
915, 932 (2005) ("Even if most bureaucrats were primarily interested in lining their own pockets,
the relationship between a larger agency budget and higher salaries or cushier working condi-
tions is empirically tenuous.").
143 See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Del-
egation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1974 n.170 (2008) (stating
that Congress is more likely to be captured by focused interest groups than are agencies); Laura
I. Langbein & Mark A. Lotwis, The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in
the U.S. House, 1986, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 413, 433-34 (1990) (concluding in a study of how
lobbyist groups affected congressional decisions on gun control that "campaign contributions
appeared to affect members' votes"); ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW
ROAD TO CORRUPTION 1-5, 38, 41, 45-46, 49-52, 79-82, 84 (1983) (discussing the acknowledg-
ment of members of Congress that campaign contributions affect their votes); PHILIP M. STERN,
STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 69-82 (1992) (detailing the attempts of outside
interest groups to court influential members of Congress).
144 See KOMESAR, supra note 130, at 54-58, 172-73, 192.
145 See Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Foreword: Post-Public Choice?, 87 COR-
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Even public-regarding agency regulators may act in favor of narrow
interests if these interests have the resources to be the most vigorous
suppliers of relevant information.
The remaining question is how the capture analysis applies to
courts. Although a few commentators have suggested that courts are
more easily controlled by factions than are agencies, 146 the more
widely held view is that courts are less likely to be captured. 47 It may
be that repeat players with the strongest interest in the precedential or
preclusive effects of a case will have a significant advantage in judicial
proceedings. 148 But just as the degree of competence is a comparative
one between courts and agencies, so too is the likelihood of bias (in
the form of capture). Saying that courts may be subject to capture
does not mean that the danger of capture is as great for courts as it is
for agencies or Congress. And the danger seems somewhat lower for
courts. This conclusion flows in significant part from the fact that
judges have life tenure and thus less concern about their future em-
ployment, have salaries and budgets that are largely free from con-
gressional meddling, and may have a greater desire for prestige (which
powerful interest groups cannot easily provide).149
NELL L. REV. 267, 268-70 (2002) (noting that behavioral research portrays people as less self-
centered than public choice suggests); cf Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the
Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KErr L. REV. 123, 146 (1989) (noting that critics of public
choice have shown only that ideology plays some role in legislative behavior and "merely limit[ ]
the appropriate claims that can be made for an economic theory of politics").
146 See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85
VA. L. REV. 1243, 1322-23 (1999) (suggesting that agencies are less likely to be controlled by
factions because they are guided by the President, and "the President's broad and heterogeneous
constituency renders the Executive relatively less vulnerable [to capture] and creates greater
concern for the broad public interest").
147 See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107,
129 (1983) (suggesting that judges tend to seek to maximize their prestige among litigants and
thus are less subject to capture). See generally KOMESAR, supra note 130, at 9-10 (arguing that
the courts have some comparative advantages when compared to other institutions).
148 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974) (explaining how "repeat players" have
advantages that give them a greater chance of success in an adjudication than "one-shotters"):
Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent
Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233,
237, 242 (1996) (discussing studies showing that parties with the greatest stake in the outcome
have an advantage in a given litigation).
149 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 530-31 (6th ed. 2003) (noting
the value of judges' "aloof disinterest" in the outcome of cases). This does not necessarily mean
that judges are insulated from their private interests. Rather, it means that their private interests
may more closely comport with interests of the public. Assuming, for example, that their private
interest is in their reputation and esteem among their colleagues and litigants, those interests
might be fairly closely aligned with the public interest.
The George Washington Law Review
It thus seems that, as a comparative matter, Congress fares least
well. It has more competence than courts but less than agencies, and
it is the most likely of all the institutions to be subject to the blandish-
ments of well-funded interest groups. Agencies fare the best on com-
petence but may also be subject to capture, including informational
capture. That said, courts' advantage on the capture axis does not
seem great enough to compensate for their limited fact-gathering ca-
pacity. If we had reason to believe that agencies were utterly be-
holden to powerful interests and courts utterly independent of them,
then the structural limitations of courts would not be enough to out-
weigh this advantage. But that seems a quite implausible description
of the difference between agencies (or, for that matter, Congress), on
the one hand, and courts, on the other, as the next Section highlights.
B. Congress Versus Courts Versus Agencies in the Innovation
Context
Now that we have laid out the broad principles above, it makes
sense to look at the history of the various institutions to see how they
have measured up in the context of innovation-related inquiries. The
events of the past do not exhaust the range of the realistic, and it
would be a mistake to limit ourselves to what has been implemented
in the past. But looking at the past provides a valuable form of
grounding. By examining failed and successful experiments, we can
gain a better sense of what is realistic. 150
1. Courts
We will start with courts. With the important exception of the
Federal Circuit's monopoly over patent appeals, innovation-related
cases currently arise in district and appellate courts all over the coun-
try. The D.C. Circuit has had a disproportionate share of such cases,
but nothing close to a majority of them and too much variability in its
behavior to allow for much in the way of useful conclusions. The Su-
preme Court, meanwhile, has simply taken too few cases to yield a
complete picture. 151 And it is not clear why any given judge or court
150 See William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Cri-
tique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 509, 518 (2000) (in conducting comparative institutional analysis
"one must also assess a wider set of contextual variables, in particular historical allocations of
power and stakeholders' and institutions' past experience and expertise .... In the policy arena,
preceding experiences and status quo legal structures will necessarily influence the course of
policy debates.").
151 As we noted earlier, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, the Court has, in the last
few years, taken some key cases that have mitigated the pro-patent tendencies of the Federal
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employee would focus on innovation, given the broad array of cases
each judge sees and the dispersion of innovation-related cases among
courts. The result is that judges lack the staff or focus that would
seem necessary to oversee innovation policy.
One obvious response, indeed the one that Congress adopted in
1982 in the context of patents, might be centralization. The Federal
Circuit was set up by Congress as the exclusive court for patent ap-
peals, and it has therefore necessarily played a central role in an im-
portant aspect of innovation policy. As we have already noted,
however, 152 its history has not been encouraging. Empirical studies
suggest that it is likely to be biased in favor of patentees, at least on
questions of validity.153 Additionally, it has disavowed any desire ex-
plicitly to formulate innovation policy (as contrasted with the ways it
formulates innovation policy implicitly through formalistic decisions
with a pro-patent bias), notwithstanding the many interpretive choices
required by the broad and open-ended language of the patent
statute. 15
4
Some might argue that the lesson to be learned from the Federal
Circuit is not that courts are defective, but that there is a happy me-
dium between the extreme decentralization of regional appellate
courts and the extreme centralization of a single court. At this inter-
mediate point, we would have the type of intercircuit competition that
tends to improve the quality of judicial decisionmaking. 155
But the problems with the Federal Circuit are hardly limited to
lack of competition-rather, many, if not most, of these problems
stem from the reality that courts have systematic limitations in their
ability to formulate policy, particularly policy on the complex scien-
tific and economic issues presented in innovation-related cases. Lay-
ing out principles of innovation policy at a very high level of
abstraction does not necessarily require any particular expertise. The
difficulty comes in implementation-making choices among compet-
ing proposals regarding, say, the most efficient uses of spectrum, or
Circuit. The trend, however, has been too recent, and the number of cases too small, to yield any
clear conclusions.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
153 See supra note 53 (citing studies).
154 See Rai, supra note 9, at 1102-22 (explaining the Federal Circuit's formalism as a mani-
festation of its refusal to engage in policymaking).
155 Craig Nard and John Duffy suggest a version of this argument when they argue that the
Federal Circuit review should be replaced by review of patent cases by a few appellate courts
that focus on patents. See Craig Allen Nard & John Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity
Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1623-24 (2007).
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the regulatory mechanisms through which new drugs should be al-
lowed on the market. Such decisions could be made by laypeople, but
we would have much more confidence if they were made by individu-
als who fully understood the scientific and economic tradeoffs in-
volved. Effective judicial regulation would thus entail hiring a sizable
staff of people with expertise. 15 6 We would also want the heads of
these judicial regulators to focus on innovation-related cases, so that
they could build up their own stores of knowledge.
Once we had done all that, however, we would simply have cre-
ated a variant of the agency structure that we currently have. To put
the point differently, we could overcome the problems with judges as
innovation regulators only by turning them into rough approximations
of agency heads. The difference would be that these "judicial agency"
heads would have life tenure and relatively little accountability. It
makes more sense to modify agencies as we see fit rather than try to
fit judges into that model.
With respect to innovation policy, there is a related advantage for
agencies and Congress that bears emphasis: while courts' power to act
is limited to ex post intervention in individual cases, agencies and Con-
gress can act ex ante, enacting legislative rules before any concrete
issue or problem arises.157 Courts can issue injunctions, of course, but
only in the context of a particular dispute. This makes courts ill-suited
to engage in the sort of forward-looking policy planning that should
be the hallmark of innovation policy.
2. Congress
Turning to Congress, the problem of capture by well-organized
and well-funded interest groups has applied with particular vigor in
156 Some commentators have argued in favor of judges who are trained in disciplines other
than law, see Adrian Vermuele, Should We Have Lay Justices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1570
(2007) (arguing that the optimal number of "lay" Supreme Court Justices trained in other disci-
plines may be greater than zero), or in favor of judges who wear "two hats"-that is, they are
trained in both law and another discipline, see Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and
Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1681 (1998). Even assuming that judges who fell
into these categories could be found, they could not do all of the relevant work themselves.
Rather, they would still have to rely on technically trained staffs. In that case, as discussed in the
text, we would simply have replicated the structure of an agency.
157 "Legislative rule" is a term of art in administrative law. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill &
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116
HARV. L. REV. 467, 576-78 (2002) (discussing the meaning of the term). To be sure, in the
context of innovation, the theoretical ability of agencies to act ex ante is limited by the reality
that several salient agencies (e.g., the PTO, the FTC) have relatively limited rulemaking author-
ity. See supra note 21.
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the area of innovation. Indeed, it is hard to identify any recent inno-
vation-related legislation with identifiable winners and losers in which
capture has not been a central dynamic. The Digital Millennium Cop-
yright Act ("DMCA") of 1998,158 which placed significant restrictions
on the extent to which technology developers and users could circum-
vent digital "fences" around both copyrighted and uncopyrighted
materials, 159 was heavily tilted toward copyright holders.16  A major
reason was that copyright holders were well-funded and well-organ-
ized on Capitol Hill, while technology developers were not.161
In recent years Congress has also debated patent reform legisla-
tion.162 But as it has progressed, legislation has been reshaped, and
distorted, by the short-term concerns of powerful interests. 163 For life
sciences firms, "innovation" is about the type of highly patent-depen-
dent work that they currently do.164 For large information technology
firms, "innovation" requires being free from immediate problems cre-
ated by patent "thickets" and "trolls. '165 Each interest group focuses
on its own short-term problems and ignores legitimate claims on the
other side.1 66 Thus far, the major congressional responses have been
relatively crude attempts at splitting the difference between the vari-
158 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
159 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
160 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 538 (1999)
("The structure of the final DMCA anti-circumvention provision and its complexity resulted
from the maximalist position with which the [Clinton] Administration and its major copyright
industry allies began the legislative struggle.").
161 See id. at 523 (noting that "by colorful use of high rhetoric and forceful lobbying,
Hollywood and its allies were successful in persuading Congress to adopt the broad anti-circum-
vention legislation they favored" as embodied by the DMCA); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and
Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 111 (2001)
(saying of the DMCA and the Copyright Term Extension Act that "[these] legislative enact-
ments-both the process by which they came to fruition as well as their substantive provisions-
give reason to pause over Congress' commitment to the public interest or, at the very least, its
understanding of the implications of the expansion of copyright law"). Perhaps not surprisingly,
because Internet service providers ("ISPs") were well represented in Congress, the DMCA
struck a better balance in designing a scheme for secondary copyright infringement liability on
the part of ISPs. See 17 U.S.C § 512.
162 See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 73 (discussing events surrounding the proposed Patent
Reform Act of 2007).
163 See id. (noting that in the case of the Patent Reform Act of 2007 "various interest
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ous interest group positions.167 Largely absent from the legislative de-
bate have been proposals for long-term reform that could
accommodate the legitimate interests of all industries, existing and fu-
ture, with a view towards advancing overall social welfare. 68
Some might argue that battles among interested groups should
not trouble us when the groups serve as proxies (usually not intention-
ally) for the public interest. A legislative battle between, say, steel
producers and steel purchasers might roughly reflect the public inter-
est by balancing the interests of steelworkers versus consumers of
steel products. A major problem for legislative battles involving inno-
vation is that future industries and innovators do not have a seat at the
lobbying table, as they either do not exist or exist in only nascent
form.
The clearer it is who the winners and losers will be, the more
intense the lobbying and the greater danger of legislation emerging
that caters to the interests of powerful incumbents. Thus legislation at
a higher level of generality may be less subject to capture-but it just
pushes the lobbying battle down to the entity that makes the difficult
choices. 69
The capture problem faced by Congress is exacerbated by (and
may in part be caused by) the inability of members of Congress to be
experts in the area of innovation. Although Congress has a staff of
almost 32,000 congressional staffers, most work in constituent ser-
vices.170 The staff available for in-depth research and analysis is fairly
167 See generally Arti K. Rai, The Story of Congressional Patent Reform: When Mancur
Olson Happens to Good Ideas (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (discussing con-
gressional attempts at compromise over post-grant opposition proceedings).
168 See id. One proposal along these lines was recently made by the Computer and Com-
munications Industry Association ("CCIA"). In a letter to Senator Leahy, CCIA proposed the
creation of an "Institute for Innovation, Economics, and Public Policy," housed within the PTO.
See Letter from Edward J. Black to Patrick J. Leahy, supra note 58. This proposal emerged,
however, after the legislation was already moribund. In contrast, some recent Supreme Court
cases have adopted patent standards that may do a reasonable job of accommodating the legiti-
mate interests of different industries, existing and future. See Arti K. Rai, Building a Better
Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation,
45 Hous. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
169 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. 165, 172 (1984) (arguing that "fire alarm"
oversight of executive actions by Congress that allows citizens the opportunity to alert Congress
to possible violations "emphasizes the interests of individuals and interest groups more than
those of the public at large"). See generally Robert P. Inman & Michael A. Fitts, Political Institu-
tions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 79 (1990).
170 See P.J. Meitl, The Perjury Paradox: The Amazing Under-Enforcement of the Laws Re-
garding Lying to Congress, 25 QuINNIPIAC L. REV. 547, 564 (2007).
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small-especially so given the breadth of subjects that Congress
touches. Congress's oversight covers everything within the purview of
any agency, leaving the relatively small congressional staff spread
fairly thinly over any given subject.1 71 Absent a significant increase in
congressional staff and focus on innovation, it seems implausible to
expect detailed congressional oversight of innovation policy. 7 2
Congress has made some attempts to bolster its expertise. Specif-
ically, it has created three entities within the congressional branch to
serve as expert advisers to Congress: the Congressional Research Ser-
vice ("CRS"), a part of the Library of Congress that provides research
to members of Congress on a wide range of subjects;173 the Congres-
sional Budget Office ("CBO"), which provides budget information to
members;174 and the GAO, which oversees the behavior of agencies
and issues reports evaluating various aspects of agencies' behavior. 175
All three are designed to be nonpartisan. 76
CRS is the broadest of the three, employing 450 researchers 177 to
answer over 500,000 questions annually from members of Congress.1 78
The questions can be on virtually any topic, so their range is enor-
mous, 17 9 and the huge number of questions combined with the exigen-
cies of the legislative process means that speed is a huge priority and
depth less so. As one commentator has put it, CRS "serves mainly as
a reference librarian and staff aide to legislators, providing facts and
171 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 143, at 1966 (noting that in Congress "[n]either
members nor their staff develop expertise about programmatic details" and that staff members
who deal with a large set of regulatory matters "generally do not come from professions that
could help inform them about the options for and the implications of regulatory decisions").
172 See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS
187-88 (4th ed. 1996) ("It is nearly impossible for a member to be fully informed on every issue
before the House.").
173 See Congressional Research Service, About CRS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/
aboutcrs.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
174 See Congressional Budget Office, About CBO, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 19, 2008).
175 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, About GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
176 See sources cited supra notes 173-75.
177 See Congressional Research Service, About CRS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfol
aboutcrs.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
178 See id.
179 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 8-37, available at
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/CRS07_AnnRpt.pdf [hereinafter CRS ANNUAL REPORT 2007] (high-
lighting various projects, covering a broad array of subject matter, that the CRS undertook at the
behest of Congress in 2007).
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figures, assisting with speechwriting, and so on."180 The GAO is
larger, with over 3000 employees, and focuses on assisting congres-
sional oversight of federal spending. Specifically, it evaluates how
well government policies and programs are working; audits agency op-
erations to determine whether federal funds are being spent effi-
ciently, effectively, and appropriately; investigates allegations of
illegal and improper activities; and sometimes issues legal decisions
and opinions on these matters.181 Finally, the CBO has 230 employees
and a much tighter focus: it makes estimates of current and future
budgets and it analyzes the effects of fiscal proposals on the budget. 182
A few points about these organizations are particularly relevant
for our purposes. First, CRS and the CBO abjure policy recommen-
dations. They issue reports laying out data, but they refuse to recom-
mend or propose policies, or even to take positions on policy
questions.83 The GAO, by contrast, does make policy recommenda-
tions in the context of its evaluations of federal agencies, although
even here the recommendations are usually that agencies take specific
actions, rather than that Congress pass particular legislation. 184
Notably, even with all of the restrictions under which the GAO,
CRS, and the CBO operate, these entities have been subject to accu-
sations of partisanship. Such complaints have frequently been lodged
against the CBO and the GAO.185 CRS has largely avoided such accu-
sations, but in so doing has demonstrated the lengths to which it be-
180 BRUCE BIMBER, THE POLITICS OF EXPERTISE IN CONGRESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 79 (1996).
181 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Our Workforce, http://www.gao.gov/about/
workforce (last visited Oct. 19, 2008); U.S. Government Accountability Office, About GAO,
http://www.gao.gov/about/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
182 See Congressional Budget Office, CBO Fact Sheet, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/fact-
sheet.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
183 See CRS ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 179, at 27 ("At CRS, we conduct our analy-
sis in an objective manner and do not try to convince anyone of a particular point of view. We'll
lay out the arguments for and against and may come to some conclusions, but we would never
make recommendations." (quoting Charles Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy));
Congressional Budget Office, CBO's Role in the Budget Process, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/
budgetprocess.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2008) ("In accordance with the CBO's mandate to
provide objective and impartial analysis, CBO's reports contain no policy recommendations.").
184 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: BROADBAND
DEPLOYMENT Is EXTENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT Is DIFFICULT TO As-
SESS THE EXTENT OF DEPLOYMENT GAPS IN RURAL AREAS 38-39 (2006), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06426.pdf (recommending that the FCC investigate options for im-
proving the information available on broadband deployment).
185 AM. ENTER. INST. & THE BROOKINGS INST., A SECOND REPORT OF THE RENEWING
CONGRESS PROJECT 73-76 (1993) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT OF THE RENEWING CONGRESS
PROJECT] (noting that the CBO and GAO have been accused of bias); BIMBER, supra note 180,
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lieves it needs to go in order to avoid any taint of partisanship. Not
only does CRS scrupulously avoid any recommendations, but also it
has an internal office whose only job is to review all outgoing reports
for balance and objectivity.18 6
Second, and relatedly, none of these agencies executes any laws.
Whether or not Congress might want to give these entities such pow-
ers, it cannot do so under prevailing Supreme Court case law. Bow-
sher v. Synar187 and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc.188 held that Congress
could not delegate executive powers to a person that Congress con-
trols.1 89 Executive powers include the execution or implementation of
laws-actions that have direct legal consequences. The result is that
these congressional agencies gather data and, in one case, make rec-
ommendations, but they cannot actually block, amend, or implement
any regulations.
Third, each of these entities is a large organization that does im-
portant work, but none of them has a focus on innovation or technol-
ogy. There was a congressional entity with a focus on technology-
OTA. And therein lies a tale illustrating both the possibility and the
limits of congressional leadership on innovation policy.
OTA was created in 1972 as a nonpartisan entity that would pro-
vide Congress with comprehensive research studies on a wide range of
scientific issues.190 The idea was for Congress to be able to rely on a
cadre of scientific experts who could serve as neutral technology ad-
visers. It was overseen by a board of directors composed of members
of both parties, in an effort to ensure its nonpartisanship.1 91
at 83-87, 91-92 (describing the various charges of bias and partisanship lodged against the CBO
and GAO).
186 BIMBER, supra note 180, at 82.
187 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
188 Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252 (1991).
189 See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
190 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., 92D CONG., TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
FOR THE CONGRESS 26-27 (Comm. Print 1972).
191 See DAVID FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW
126 (2000) (stating that the OTA "operated essentially free of political influence and was con-
trolled by a bipartisan board of directors").
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OTA's studies were generally highly regarded. 192 But it issued
only about thirty studies per year, 193 and thus its reports did not cover
many important technology issues. Moreover, like CRS and the CBO,
it never made any policy recommendations, formally abjuring such a
role in an effort to make it politically viable.1 94 Even with the prohibi-
tion on policy recommendations, however, over the years many mem-
bers of Congress (usually Republicans) criticized OTA as partisan. 195
And when Republicans gained control of both Houses of Congress in
1994 for the first time in forty years, one of their first acts was to
abolish OTA. 196 So even with its modest portfolio and refusal to make
recommendations, OTA was still ripe for abolition when the political
winds changed.
OTA's story-and that of the CRS, the GAO, and the CBO-
should not surprise us. Lots of nonpartisan entities give advice to
Congress. Having an expert advisor inside the legislative branch
rather than outside it might be comforting to those who are allowed to
choose its leaders. But those who do not choose its leaders may feel
that they have no more reason to trust it than they do a nonpartisan
expert advisor outside of Congress (e.g., the National Academies).
Indeed, they probably have less reason to trust a congressionally cre-
ated entity, if they believe that the leaders of the congressional entity
were chosen by Representatives or Senators who do not share their
political goals. 197
192 See SECOND REPORT OF THE RENEWING CONGRESS PROJECT, supra note 185, at 74
(stating in 1993 that the OTA "is considered highly credible by members of both parties and is
well regarded by its technical competence").
193 See BIMBER, supra note 180, at 71.
194 See Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-484, 86 Stat. 797 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 471-481 (2006)); S. REP. No. 92-1123, at 19 app. (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3568, 3584 ("The OTA would not be empowered to make recommendations
for legislative action, or to render advice on courses of action, nor would it possess any kind of
regulatory powers."); Robert M. Margolis & David H. Guston, The Origins, Accomplishments,
and Demise of the Office of Technology Assessment, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR
CONGRESS 53, 64 (M. Granger Morgan & Jon M. Peha eds., 2003) (discussing "OTA's inability to
make policy recommendations").
195 See generally MICHAEL S. WARNER, HERITAGE FOUND., REASSESSING THE OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASsEssMENT (1984), http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/
upload/91208_1.pdf (discussing Republican criticism of the OTA during the early 1980s).
196 See BIMBER, supra note 180, at 69 (explaining that the OTA "came to an abrupt end in
1995" as a result of being "caught up in the 'Republican Revolution' ... that followed the
election of 1994").
197 The traditional problem with congressional entities is that their leaders are chosen by
the majority party (for example, the majority chooses the head of the CBO). See Congressional
Budget Office, CBO Fact Sheet, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/factsheet.shtm (last visited Oct.




The range of administrative agencies is of course huge, but some
loom particularly large for purposes of innovation policy. Perhaps the
two most obvious are the PTO and the FCC, as each regulates an area
that is subject to innovation (by definition, in the case of the PTO)
and that, in reality, has seen an enormous amount of change. For bet-
ter or worse, the PTO does not engage in substantive rulemaking, and
it does not have a staff of experts whose responsibility is making inno-
vation-related policy.198 Rather, when the PTO makes substantive
policy decisions, it typically does so through the ordinary processes it
uses to grant, deny, or reexamine patent applications. The FCC, by
contrast, does have substantive rulemaking authority (and issues many
rules), and it has hundreds of engineers, economists, and lawyers
whose job is to help inform the rulemaking process and decisions that
the FCC's commissioners make. 199
In light of its status as a full-fledged agency, the FCC is the most
appropriate agency to evaluate for purposes of determining the rela-
tive merits of having (and, more importantly, attempting to improve
upon) an administrative model in innovation policy.
Perhaps the two most noticeable themes in FCC history have
been its catering to powerful interests and, quite relatedly, its thwart-
ing of the deployment of new technologies. 200 The powerful interests
of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate). The creators of the OTA tried
to overcome this problem by creating a bipartisan board that oversaw it. See supra note 191 and
accompanying text. Even with respect to the OTA, though, many Republicans saw the OTA as
guided by Democrats. Chris Mooney, Requiem for an Office, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 40 ("conservatives suspected the office of being a 'happy hunting ground of
[leading sponsor Ted] Kennedy apparatchiks' and 'liberal technocrats"'). Republican members
of the board overseeing the OTA defended it, but other Republicans dismissed those defenses.
Marcia Gelbart, Senate Appropriators Decide to Eliminate OTA, but Spare the GAO, THE HILL,
May 31, 1995 ("In spite of appearances on behalf of the 21-year-old agency by Sens. Edward
Kennedy (D-Mass.), Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), [Republican Chair-
man Connie] Mack still resolved to carry through with plans to scrap OTA.").
198 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Organizational Structure,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/offices.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2008) (failing to include in its
listed organizational structure any position focusing on innovation policy).
199 See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, 2007 ANNUAL FCC EMPLOYEE SURVEY RESPONSES tbl.2
(2007), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-280549Al.pdf (reporting what
percentage of FCC employees belong to various occupation groups, including attorney, econo-
mist, and engineer).
200 See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spec-
trum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave
Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 405-51 (2001) (discussing several examples of
how capture by incumbent interests thwarted the development of new technology in the FCC's
allocation of spectrum rights).
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have often been incumbent industries that the FCC regulates-most
prominently broadcasters.2 01 And one issue that unites incumbents is
the desirability of barriers to entry for potential new competitors-
particularly disruptive competitors-so it is not surprising that the
FCC's responsiveness to incumbents has entailed hostility to disrup-
tive innovations and innovators.
A prominent example of both hostility to new technologies and
responsiveness to powerful incumbents is the early history of FCC
regulation of cable television. Broadcasters saw the competition that
cable represented as a threat, and they persuaded the FCC to view the
matter similarly.202 The result was that the FCC promulgated both
explicit and implicit limits on the growth of cable. 20 3 Examples of the
latter included: tight restrictions on cable operators' ability to import
signals from other markets,204 rules ensuring that broadcasters alone
could show certain movies and sports events,20 5 and a requirement
that cable operators carry all local broadcast stations.2 06 Broadcasters
201 See, e.g., id. at 415-22 (discussing how network broadcasters used the FCC to block the
expansion of cable television).
202 See id.
203 See Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 81-91 (1981) (noting FCC actions that limited growth of cable in
an attempt to protect local broadcast stations); Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-
Part I: Why Can't Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L. REV. 212, 263-64 (1987) ("The
history of cable regulation largely reflects the FCC's concern over cable's competitive impact on
broadcasting and the potential harm to the Commission's basic policy of fostering and protecting
local broadcasters who serve local community needs."); see also Amendment of Subpart L, Part
91, To Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio
Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., 2 F.C.C.2d 725,
774-78 (1966) (placing limits on the growth of cable, in light of concerns about local UHF
broadcasters).
204 See Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations Rela-
tive to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys.; and Inquiry into the Dev. of Commc'ns Tech. and Servs.
to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, 36 F.C.C.2d 143,
167 (1972); Amendment of Subpart L, 2 F.C.C.2d at 782; Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, To
Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., 38 F.C.C. 683, 690-701
(1965).
205 See Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations Rela-
tive to Cmty. Antenna Television Sys.; and Inquiry into the Dev. of Commc'ns Tech. and Servs.
to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, 23 F.C.C.2d 825
app. A (1970). Commentators have argued the rules "were designed to protect broadcasting
from the perceived threat presented by early cable television but ended up stifling cable's devel-
opment for no good reason." Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1103, 1196 (1993). In 1977, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the rules as outside
the FCC's authority. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 31-34 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
206 See 47 U.S.C. § 534(a) (2006) ("Each cable operator shall carry, on the cable system of
that operator, the signals of local commercial television stations and qualified low power stations
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sought all of these rules, and the FCC obligingly imposed them.20 7 As
the FCC Chairman frankly noted in 1971, the FCC interpreted its
public interest mandate to include "protectionism for over-the-air
broadcasting. °20 8 Similarly, the FCC frequently supported AT&T's ef-
fort to prevent innovators from entering its markets, agreeing with
AT&T that it could ban a metal device that snapped on to the end of
AT&T's phones to muffle outside noises209 and later preventing the
nascent MCI from directly competing with AT&T.210 In each case, the
competitor was allowed into the market, but only because the courts
invalidated the restrictions that the FCC had imposed on
competition. 211
Then there are examples of lengthy delays by the FCC that hin-
dered the development of new technologies. A prominent example
(among many) is cellular telephony. Cellular telephony was devel-
oped and ready for deployment by the late 1960s. 212 The FCC initi-
as provided by this section."); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997)
(upholding legislation under intermediate scrutiny because the record supported "Congress' pre-
dictive judgment that the must-carry provisions further important governmental interests").
207 See Amendment of Part C, Part 91, To Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay Television
Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 736 (1966) ("[T]hese requirements were neces-
sary to ameliorate the risk that a burgeoning [cable] industry would have a future adverse impact
on television broadcast service, both existing and potential."); see also Jonathan Weinberg,
Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the United States, 39 BuFF. L. REV.
615, 700 (1991) (concluding that in the early regulation of cable, the FCC "sought to preserve the
market position of the over-the-air broadcasters, its long-term clients").
208 Cable Antenna Television (CATV): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Communications
and Power of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 34 (1971) (statement
of Dean Burch, Chairman, FCC).
209 See Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391, 397 (1955) (disallowing the Hush-A-Phone on
the rationale that such a "foreign attachment" could harm AT&T's network).
210 See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding that
the FCC's granting of a de jure monopoly to AT&T in the telecommunications industry was
against the public interest); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (re-
buking a challenge by the FCC and AT&T to the previous ruling allowing competition in the
telecommunications industry).
211 The federal government eventually brought a lawsuit to break up AT&T, leading to the
separation of long-distance from local service. This is widely regarded as one of the most suc-
cessful implementations of antitrust principles to foster competition in services that could be
competitive but were dominated by a single company. AT&T had leveraged its market power in
local telephony into dominance in other markets, and the breakup of AT&T ended that lever-
age. But the litigation against AT&T was brought by the DOJ, not the FCC. This was probably
the most successful telecommunications regulatory initiative of the last half century, and it was
not done by the FCC.
212 See John W. Berresford, The Impact of Law and Regulation on Technology: The Case
History of Cellular Radio, 44 Bus. LAW. 721, 721 (1989) (stating that cellular radio technology
was invented in the late 1960s).
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ated proceedings on the dedication of spectrum for cellular telephony
in 1968.213 These proceedings extended over six years, and a decision
to set aside spectrum for cellular telephony did not emerge until
1974.214 The FCC then took another seven years to actually authorize
cellular service (in 1981).215 In 1982 the FCC finally started issuing
licenses to cellular providers, and in 1983 the first cellular providers
began offering service-fifteen years after the FCC began its proceed-
ings on cellular. 216 The FCC's lengthy processes delayed the introduc-
tion of cellular telephony by at least ten years, which reduced
economic welfare by hundreds of billions of dollars in today's
dollars.217
The cellular telephony example is an instance of a larger problem
with respect to spectrum rights-namely, that the FCC moved very
slowly to open up this precious resource to new uses. In many situa-
tions, the FCC was slow to remove incumbents despite strong evi-
dence (which proved correct, once the spectrum's use did change) that
new uses would be more valuable than those that they would replace.
The FCC kept spectrum devoted to, for example, instructional televi-
213 See id. at 724 ("In 1968, the FCC, noting 'serious congestion' on the frequencies that
were then available, showed interest for the first time in a 'truly efficient high capacity' mobile
telephone service."); Hazlett, supra note 200, at 512-13 (noting that FCC proceedings concern-
ing cellular telephony were initiated in 1968).
214 See An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz; and
Amendment of Parts 2, 18, 21, 73, 74, 89, 91, and 93 of the Rules Relative to Operations in the
Land Mobile Serv. Between 806 and 960 MHz, 46 F.C.C.2d 752, 756-57 (1974) (allocating, for
the first time, spectrum for cellular service).
215 See An Inquiry Into the Use of Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular
Commc'ns Sys.; and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Comm'n's Rules Relative to Cellular
Commc'ns Sys., 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 470 (1981) (authorizing the assignment of spectrum for cellular
communication systems on a commercial basis), modified, 89 F.C.C.2d 58 (1982) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration), further modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982) (Further Re-
consideration Order); Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service,
7 F.C.C.R. 4028, 4028 3 (1992) (noting that in 1981 the FCC first authorized commercial cellu-
lar service).
216 See Certain Cellular Rural Service Area Applications, 14 F.C.C.R. 4619, 4619 (1999)
(noting that the FCC began awarding cellular licenses in 1982); Mobile Radio, in 11 MCGRAW-
HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 289, 290 (1987) (noting that the first com-
mercial cellular service began on October 13, 1983, in Chicago, Illinois).
217 See Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommu-
nications, in BROOKINOS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcnviTY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 22-23 (Martin
Nell Bailey et al. eds., 1997) (estimating consumer welfare losses of $33.5 billion per year in 1994
dollars due to the FCC's delay in authorizing cellular services); JEFFREY H. ROHLFS ET AL.,
NAT'L ECON. RES. AssoCs., INC., ESTIMATE OF THE LOSS TO THE UNITED STATES CAUSED BY
THE FCC's DELAY IN LICENSING CELLULAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 (1999) (estimating that
the FCC's delay in authorizing cellular telephone service reduced economic welfare by more
than $86 billion in 1990 dollars).
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sion fixed service, low-power television, and fixed microwave services
long after it became clear that these services were not very valuable
and that other uses of the spectrum would be much more valuable. 218
In other situations, the FCC's spectrum policies have kept some spec-
trum underutilized or unutilized, which serves the interests of incum-
bents who do not want competition but freezes out new potential
services. 219
The common theme running through all these examples is protec-
tion of incumbents at the expense of new technologies. It may be that
some of these new technologies were not, in fact, worth accommodat-
ing. But it is remarkable how frequently the FCC sided with incum-
bents, which indicates that there is much room for improvement in
agency decisionmaking.
There is, however, more to the story. In the last two decades the
ideological divide between Republican and Democratic commission-
ers on the FCC has been relatively clear and consistent with respect to
most issues: Democrats have been more sympathetic to regulations
designed to mandate salutary programming, to use funds to subsidize
service for underserved communities, to limit the market power of any
given entity and to ensure both citizens' and competitors' access to
incumbents' networks, and more generally to require "open access"
provisions.220 Republicans have generally taken the opposite posi-
tions, believing that market solutions will be preferable. Examples in-
clude mandates of children's television (which a Republican FCC
rejected and a Democratic FCC implemented), funding for universal
service programs, and proposals for dedicated airtime for political is-
sues and candidates. 221 Similarly, the battle lines were clear in the
FCC's massive media ownership review and resulting order (which
passed on a three-to-two vote 222), with Republicans favoring a relaxa-
tion of the FCC's media-specific ex ante ownership restrictions and
more reliance on general antitrust principles, and Democrats favoring
218 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment
Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 11-25 (2002).
219 See id. at 18 (discussing the FCC's decision to set aside spectrum for ultra-high-fre-
quency television that was seldom used due to lack of interest from broadcasters despite the fact
that such spectrum could have been put to other uses).
220 See generally BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 78; Adam Candeub & Keith Brown, What
Do Commissioners Want? Estimating Regulator Preferences at the Federal Communications Com-
mission (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with authors).
221 Id.
222 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership Rules
and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R.
13,620, 13,620 (2003).
2008]
The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:1
the FCC keeping its restrictions.223 Democratic commissioners have
also supported provisions designed to open cable networks both to
competing channels (e.g., the requirement that cable operators carry
local stations and provide leased access to competitors) and to citizens
and local governments (e.g., mandating public, educational, and gov-
ernmental cable channels), while Republicans have generally opposed
them.224
Thus, when the Telecommunications Act of 1996225 was enacted
in a Democratic administration, it was not surprising that the FCC
(usually by three-to-two votes) moved fairly aggressively to unbundle
the incumbent local exchange carriers' networks, giving potential local
competitors maximum flexibility to pick the elements of the incum-
bents' network that they wanted to use and implementing a pricing
scheme favorable to new entrants.226 This served as a counter-exam-
ple to the FCC's historical support for the position of incumbents.
223 See, e.g., infra note 300 (quoting Democratic Commissioner Copps's impassioned dis-
sent after a three-to-two vote in favor of relaxed media ownership rules).
224 See generally BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 78.
225 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
226 See William R. Drexel, Telecom Public Policy Schizophrenia: Schumpeterian Destruction
Versus Managed Competition, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 11-16 (2004) (describing the steps taken by
the FCC to implement the unbundling required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996). The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 provided for competition in the local exchange (also known as
the local loop) by, inter alia, giving new entrants access to elements of the incumbents' network
on an unbundled basis. If an element was necessary for a competitor, and if the competitor
would be impaired without such access, then the competitor would have access to it. See AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-88 (1999). Under Democratic leadership, the FCC
was much more sympathetic to the arguments of the new entrants, and concomitantly much less
sympathetic to the arguments of the incumbents, than the courts proved to be. See BENJAMIN ET
AL., supra note 78, at 810-25; U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 594-95 (D.C. Cir. 2004);
U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Beyond this comparison, it
seems fair to say that, in an absolute sense, the FCC's position was very favorable to the new
entrants. The Commission allowed the new entrants to bundle together all the elements of the
incumbents' networks necessary to provide service. That is, via unbundling, a new entrant could
put together a competing service without contributing any physical elements on its own. This is
particularly striking because the statute already allowed new entrants to resell, at wholesale
prices, the incumbent's local telephone service. Allowing new entrants to combine the unbun-
dled elements into a complete package thus provided an alternative to resale. See BENJAMIN ET
AL., supra note 78, at 772-74, 805-10. The Commission's pricing methodology was advocated by
new entrants and despised by incumbents. It priced the elements based on what a hypothetically
efficient network would cost to build, and the fact that the actual network might have cost much
more (given that prices for computing power have steadily decreased for decades) was of no
import. The pricing methodology meant that the new entrants could get access to unbundled
elements at fairly low prices. It also meant that combining unbundled elements into a complete
package was likely to be much cheaper than resale. Id. at 825-42; see also Verizon Commc'ns,
Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 549-50 (2002).
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But it reflected, and reinforced, the prevailing ideological split among
the commissioners. And, for better or worse, the FCC's regulations
aimed at mandating access to the incumbents' networks were repeat-
edly rejected by the D.C. Circuit as inconsistent with the Telecommu-
nications Act. 227 This produced a back-and-forth between the D.C.
Circuit and the FCC that ended only in 2004, more than eight years
after passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, when the FCC fi-
nally promulgated regulations that the D.C. Circuit found consistent
with the Telecommunications Act's language.2 28
We have more than anecdotes on these matters. Daniel Ho re-
cently compiled the largest dataset ever assembled of FCC adjudica-
tions and rulemakings, covering 1965 to 2006 and containing 94,693
votes by 46 commissioners in 17,879 rulemakings and adjudications. 229
After careful examination of the voting patterns, Ho found that "the
effect of commissioner ideology on voting is profound. Commissioner
partisan affiliation exhibits robust and large predictive power over
votes, even holding constant the party of the appointing president. 2 30
Ho's findings strongly corroborate the theory that partisan require-
ments genuinely constrain presidents and contradict the notion that
expertise exclusively drives decisionmaking.
The relevance of this ideological split for purposes of our concern
with innovation is twofold. First, it is clear that ideology sometimes
drives FCC commissioners to advance redistributional or other
nonmarket values in their actions. As we discuss further below, ideo-
logical efforts to advance values other than innovation are consistent
with our vision of an innovation regulator. The innovation regulator's
analysis would feed into the larger cost-benefit analysis, within which
distributional questions could be addressed. The innovation regulator
would also play a role in ensuring that such values were advanced in a
manner that was least damaging to innovation. On the other hand, as
the example of the Telecommunications Act makes clear, Democratic
and Republican commissioners may simply take different (and per-
227 See U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 359 F.3d at 594-95 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting certain elements
used by the FCC for impairment determinations for purposes of unbundling networks); U.S.
Telecom Ass'n, 290 F.3d at 417 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that the FCC did not adequately con-
sider the dictates of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in establishing national rules for the
unbundling of networks).
228 See BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 78, at 823.
229 Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Require-
ments on Regulation (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3, available at http://dho.stanford.edu/
research/partisan.pdf).
230 Id. at 4.
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haps uninformed) positions on the extent to which mandated access to
a platform is necessary to promote innovation. Because this question
is a recurrent theme in innovation economics, an innovation regulator
would be particularly well-suited to provide input. Ideally, its input
on the issue would serve the useful function of reducing the role of
ideology in a social science debate that is subject to empirical testing.
C. Implications for the Location of the Innovation Regulator
The foregoing discussion of the specific features of the various
institutions that currently formulate innovation policy has significant
implications for the location of our proposed innovation regulator.
Creating a more centralized innovation regulator in the judicial
branch does not make much sense. The most plausible version of such
a regulator would be a court (or perhaps a few courts) that had an
"innovation mission" and oversaw all innovation-related cases. Even
with greater centralization, however, it is difficult to imagine courts
with the expertise necessary to serve as innovation regulators. And
even if that level of expertise could somehow be achieved, Article III
still stands in the way of any federal court acting as the ex ante regula-
tor that would be desirable in at least some cases.
As a policy matter, an innovation regulator that improved con-
gressional decisionmaking would appear quite attractive. Congress
has a tremendous amount of influence in shaping innovation policy,
and it is quite likely to exercise that influence poorly. A requirement
that the regulator have actual power, however, eliminates the possibil-
ity of a congressionally controlled regulator. As noted earlier, Bow-
sher v. Synar231 and Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Airport Noise, Inc.232 held that Congress
could not delegate the power to execute laws to a person that Con-
gress controls. As the Court stated in Metropolitan Washington Air-
ports Authority:
If the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit
an agent of Congress to exercise it. If the power is legisla-
tive, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicam-
eralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7. In
short, when Congress "'[takes] action that ha[s] the purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch,' it must take
231 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).




that action by the procedures authorized in the
Constitution.233
The result of these cases is a flat prohibition on Congress delegat-
ing authority to modify or delay laws to entities that it controls. Con-
gress can exercise such authority itself or delegate it to an executive
agency, but Congress cannot give it to a legislative entity.
Congress could promise to take up an entity's recommendation,
perhaps even creating a precommitment device for ensuring that the
recommendation is introduced in the House and Senate. But intro-
duction is not passage, and what matters is passage. And if there are
enough votes to enact the recommendation, it will not matter whether
Congress precommitted to consider the recommendation. There is no
getting around the fact that the recommendation will have only as
much force as Congress chooses to give it. The recommendation may
persuade some members of Congress (as may anyone else's recom-
mendation), but that is a far cry from a decision that has real teeth.
The recommendation will merely be hortatory.
In order to ameliorate the very significant problem of capture
faced by Congress (and to avoid creating situations where agencies'
organic statutes force them to act in contradictory ways234), Congress
still can and should have its own entity (perhaps a revived OTA) mak-
ing recommendations. Such input could be valuable in persuading
members of Congress as well as the general public, even if its legal
impact were fairly modest. But the broader role of innovation regula-
tor cannot be played by an entity that Congress controls.
That leaves the executive branch as the most plausible home for
an innovation regulator. Although an executive branch regulator
233 Id. at 276 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983)); see also id. at 272 ("Con-
gress itself can formulate the details, or it can enact general standards and assign to the Execu-
tive Branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformance with
those standards."). As Brad Clark put it:
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority confirms that Chadha and Bowsher
recognize "two basic and related [constitutional] constraints on the Congress." Al-
though it is sometimes difficult to characterize broad policymaking discretion as
either executive or legislative power in the abstract, the identity of the actor exer-
cising such power largely determines its constitutionality. If such power is assigned
to an executive officer, then the power is presumptively "executive," and its exer-
cise raises only a question under the nondelegation doctrine. If, on the other hand,
such power is retained by Congress or assigned to one of its agents, then the power
is presumptively "legislative," and the actor in question "must follow the 'single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures' specified in Article I."
Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321,
1385-86 (2001) (quoting Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 274).
234 See supra text accompanying notes 75-92.
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would not be able to resolve problems created by the plain language
of statutes, it could aim to coordinate and promote a pro-innovation
agenda that operates within the realm of agencies' delegated author-
ity. Additionally, as we discuss further in Part IV, we would explicitly
design our innovation regulator so as to avoid unnecessary prolifera-
tion of executive branch offices and (relatedly) agency obligations.
IV. Our Proposal-An Office of Innovation Policy
Having resolved the question of where the innovation regulator
should be located, we now turn to the specifics of its operation within
the executive branch: first, should the innovation regulator be central-
ized or decentralized; second, precisely how much legal authority
should it have; third, what sort of analysis should it undertake; and
fourth, how should it be created? These questions are closely related,
and the answers to some depend on answers to others. But all are
necessary to flesh out what a desirable executive branch innovation
regulator would look like.
A. Degree of Centralization
We begin with the question of centralization. Specifically, should
each agency (say, by executive order) be required to take innovation
into account, or should we have a regulator that employs a more
centralized analysis? The trade-offs between centralized and decen-
tralized regulators are well-known.23 5 To oversimplify greatly, central-
ization allows for efficiency and clarity, but at the possible cost of bad
decisionmaking (whether due to capture or otherwise). The central-
ized regulator might make a bad decision and adhere to it without
ever squarely (or perhaps fairly) confronting alternatives. Decentrali-
zation allows for experimentation and thus the opportunity to see real
alternatives in action. But it achieves experimentation at the cost of
disuniformity, lack of focus on the regulatory objective, potentially
significant transaction costs for regulated entities subject to a welter of
different regimes, and significant government costs arising from so
many regulators covering similar ground. We do not seek to rehash
that debate here. Our point is simply one of balance: innovation regu-
lation within the executive branch (and outside of it) is currently at
one end of the spectrum. Even the centralized appeals court for pat-
ent cases sees only a small portion of innovation-related issues (with
235 See generally Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570,
599-613 (1996) (discussing the arguments for and against both centralization and decentraliza-
tion in the context of environmental regulation).
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the perhaps predictable result that its vision of innovation has histori-
cally been one in which patents are preeminent).236 There is no expert
entity that looks at innovation generally. The system is entirely piece-
meal. Even for those who advocate a decentralized approach, this is
extreme. Moreover, as we have noted, the costs of such radical decen-
tralization seem particularly high with respect to innovation. Simply
stated, it seems folly to continue with a haphazard regime in which
congressional legislation, agency action, and court decisions look at
only one particular industry or innovation incentive, and none looks
more broadly at innovation policy.
A striking example of the difficulties entailed by decentralization
is agencies' response to an executive order that requires them to ana-
lyze the impact of their decisions on federalism values.237 As both the
GAO and Nina Mendelson have found, agencies have largely ignored
this requirement. Specifically, each found federalism impact state-
ments in less than one percent of rulemakings, despite the fact that a
much higher percentage of agency rules would seem to call for feder-
alism analyses under the guidelines set forth in the executive order.238
This does not necessarily mean that agencies act in bad faith. The
problem may well be that agencies are unfamiliar with federalism
analysis and deem the resources entailed in acquiring the relevant ex-
pertise prohibitive. 239 The point is simply that asking the existing
agencies to take on new, overarching analyses-whether federalism or
innovation-is a tall order, and one that may not be filled very well by
the wide range of existing agencies.
What about the possibility of moving to the other extreme, and
having complete centralization? For example, Congress could replace
agencies that currently regulate innovation (whether by design or by
default) with a new entity that would do their jobs and focus entirely
236 See supra text accompanying note 53-56.
237 See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255-56 (Aug. 4, 1999). For earlier
executive orders similarly requiring agencies to perform federalism impact analyses, see Exec.
Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 26, 1987) and Exec. Order No. 12,372, 47 Fed. Reg.
30,959 (July 14, 1982).
238 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12612 IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 4 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1999/gg99093t.pdf (finding that only five federalism impact assessments had been prepared for
the over 11,000 final rules agencies issued between April 1996 and December 1998); Mendelson,
supra note 104, at 783 (finding five published federalism impact statements among 600 proposed
and final rules during one quarter of 2003).
239 See Mendelson, supra note 104, at 786 ("Agency lack of expertise might be explained by
lack of resources. Training employees in implementing the agency's national programs may be
sufficient to exhaust agency resources.").
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on innovation. That is, Congress could eliminate agencies with a nar-
row focus on a particular industry or innovation incentive and replace
them with a "Department of Innovation."
Complete centralization would, however, represent a massive,
very costly change-the dislocation and transition costs would be
great. In part because of those costs, complete centralization is very
unlikely. It is difficult to imagine any realistic state of affairs in which
Congress decided to abandon administrative agencies that have spent
decades building up their own institutional knowledge, not to mention
abandoning Congress's own familiarity with the agencies.
Moreover, there are considerable advantages in having agencies
with specialized knowledge. Regulation of areas like the environ-
ment, telecommunications, and drug safety is enormously complex.
Thus it is unlikely that a regulator with expertise in innovation gener-
ally (as opposed to, say, environmental issues specifically) would ever
understand the intricacies of environmental regulation with sufficient
depth to make the very finely calibrated decisions that implementa-
tion of environmental statutes requires.
Most importantly, many of the agencies that currently regulate
innovation also pursue other, equally important regulatory objectives.
For example, as we discussed in Part III, the FCC's Democratic com-
missioners have often viewed its "public interest" mission as including
redistribution and the promotion of salutary programming. 240 Al-
though these objectives could conceivably be pursued outside an in-
dustry-specific context (for example, we might have an agency with
the mission of "promoting redistribution"), such a reorientation is dif-
ficult to imagine and seems undesirable.
We are left then with some advantages to a horizontal regulator
(that is, a regulator in charge of innovation, wherever it may arise)
and other advantages to vertical regulators (like the FCC, which con-
siders innovation alongside other goals as it regulates telecommunica-
tions, or the patent system, which considers innovation-to the extent
it considers innovation at all-only in the context of that innovation
incentive). Vertical (or sector-specific) regulation allows for greater
expertise, but also for tunnel vision and a failure to encourage innova-
tion. Horizontal regulation encourages innovation but at the cost of
sector-specific expertise and a focus on other goals.
Even if we reject complete centralization (and complete decen-
tralization), that still leaves a range of possibilities. Fruitful discussion
240 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 77:1
Fixing Innovation Policy
of these possibilities is inextricably linked to a decision about how
much authority the regulator should have in the first instance. We
turn next to this question.
B. What Authority Should It Have?
As an initial matter, it bears emphasis that, even in situations
where the innovation regulator did not have legal authority, its input
could be significant. For example, given its expertise it should be the
primary executive branch entity responsible for filing amicus briefs in
the large number of cases (before the Federal Circuit, the D.C. Cir-
cuit, and otherwise) that raise questions of innovation policy. Al-
though a range of agencies (e.g., the PTO and the FTC) sometimes
play this role, none is particularly well-suited to doing so. The PTO
lacks any social science expertise, and the FTC's mission encompasses
many issues other than innovation. In relevant cases before the Su-
preme Court, an Office of Innovation Policy could assist the Justice
Department's Solicitor General in cases where the government is ei-
ther a party or the Supreme Court asks the Solicitor General for its
views.
However, as we have already suggested in the context of OTA, a
hortatory role is insufficient. Thus we devote the bulk of our analysis
to what legal authority our proposed regulator would have.
1. A First Cut on Power-Rejecting the Extremes
With respect to legal authority, some salient options include: au-
thority to create and promulgate regulations; to amend regulations
proposed by existing agencies (or, in the case of agencies like the PTO
that act primarily via adjudication, other agency actions); to block pro-
posed agency actions; to remand (but not permanently block) pro-
posed actions for further consideration; to delay proposed actions for
further review; and/or to review proposed actions with no authority to
take any further action. The innovation regulator's authority could
also be enhanced via standards of judicial review-for example, mak-
ing its decisions unreviewable, placing a presumption behind its rec-
ommendations, forcing the substantive agency to justify its action if
the innovation regulator disapproved of it, or asking whether the
agency took a hard look at the innovation regulator's contrary
suggestions.
We begin with a first cut: In our view, the extremes are unattrac-
tive. Giving an innovation regulator the authority unilaterally to
block or promulgate regulations or adjudications arguably places in-
2008]
The George Washington Law Review
novation above all other goals that administrative agencies have and,
for that matter, turns administrative agencies into mere recommend-
ers to the innovation entity. Such concentration of power in one en-
tity, and the concomitant privileging of innovation above other goals,
is excessive. As we have emphasized in this Article, innovation is tre-
mendously important, and we think that fostering innovation should
be made an explicit goal of regulatory policy.2 41 But a goal does not
mean the goal. Agencies (as directed by Congress) have lots of other
important goals-for example, distributional concerns, health and
safety protection, and the like. Nothing in this Article is meant to
suggest that innovation should replace or overwhelm such other goals,
and indeed we do not adhere to such a position. The burden of dem-
onstrating that innovation should trump all other considerations is a
very great one, and we do not believe that innovation-or any other
single consideration-can meet it. The government rightly has a
broad range of sometimes competing goals, and it is hard to imagine a
persuasive argument for picking one that would overwhelm all the
others. For similar reasons, such a proposal is so politically unpalat-
able that its chances of passage are slim to none. It will not happen,
and for good reason.
At the other end of the spectrum, as we have already noted in the
context of our discussion of OTA and Congress, an innovation regula-
tor that made recommendations with no legal consequences whatso-
ever also seems unattractive, as it would be too easy to ignore.242
There are many entities-governmental and otherwise-that can and
do make recommendations to Congress and to administrative agen-
cies. Without the backing provided by some enforcement mechanism,
241 See supra Part I.A.
242 Like the former OTA, an existing office that has congressional authorization to do in-
teragency work that overlaps significantly with innovation policy-the Office of Science and
Technology Policy-is not authorized to issue recommendations with clear legal significance.
Thus it appears to have limited power. Compare Steve Merrill, Organizing the White House for
Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy (working paper 2008) (on file with authors) (noting
that the Office of Science and Technology Policy is a relatively weak office but attributing that
weakness to the fact that it has narrower jurisdiction than other executive offices do).
Similarly, the White House Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, recently cre-
ated by Congress as part of its 2008 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008), is authorized to coordinate intellectual
property enforcement across agencies but does not appear to have the authority to override
individual agencies. In the case of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, however,
possible weakness may be salutary. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying note 51,
although intellectual property rights (particularly patent rights) can be important for innovation,
they can also impede innovation.
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those recommendations often have little weight.2 43 Merely making
recommendations might make sense in those situations in which the
recommender is bringing forward information that was entirely un-
known to the relevant decisionmaker and the decisionmaker does not
have a vested interest in ignoring that information. But in a signifi-
cant number of regulatory contexts, including the innovation context,
the initial decisionmaker will often have chosen her path with some
awareness of information and arguments that would lead in a different
direction. The problem, as the previous Part highlights, is that the
decisionmaker may suffer from tunnel vision or capture, or more gen-
erally be unduly influenced by interests relevant to its mission that are
not consonant with the public interest.2 4 In those situations, unen-
forceable recommendations will likely produce very little. If we want
our governing structure to take innovation policy seriously, it needs
some actual power-some ability to alter the course of proposed
regulations.
Once again, agencies' failure to implement the federalism execu-
tive order is instructive.2 45 Although the executive order requires fed-
eralism impact analyses, this requirement is not enforceable in
court.2 46 With no backup enforcement mechanism to discipline agen-
cies that fail to undertake the federalism analysis, the executive order
has been widely ignored.2 47 For agencies with no expertise in federal-
ism-or innovation-even a "requirement" in an executive order
likely will not be sufficient to prod them to do the analysis at all, much
less well.
2. Fleshing Out Its Power
Having made some broad determinations about an innovation
regulator-it should have some power and it should be in the execu-
tive branch-we now turn to a more fine-grained discussion. We ulti-
mately propose that the President (or Congress, if Congress is willing)
create an Office of Innovation Policy ("OIP") that would draw upon,
and feed into, existing regulatory review processes but would have the
specific mission of being the "innovation champion" within these
243 See supra text at p. 55.
244 See supra Part III.B.3.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 237-38.
246 See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,259 (Aug. 10, 1999) ("This order is
intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not intended
to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the
United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.").
247 See supra note 149-50 and accompanying text.
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processes. We choose the OIP moniker as a matter of convenience,
and to highlight its role. OIP need not be a new freestanding entity.
It could also be folded into an existing one-for instance, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, which Congress established in 1976 to
focus, inter alia, on developing "sound science and technology policies
and budgets. 248 What matters more than nomenclature and exact lo-
cation in the alphabet soup of executive branch entities is the power it
exercises and the substantive analysis it undertakes.
We begin by returning to the question of how much power our
innovation regulator should have. Our earlier discussion rejecting the
extremes of power (ability to block agency action versus hortatory
power only) leaves a range of options. How do we choose among
them? This question of how much power to give to a regulator is a
perennial one in institutional design, and it implicates a broad range
of considerations that, depending on their weighting, can yield differ-
ent answers. We do not believe that there is only one possible answer
here-indeed, it would be folly to claim that there was. But we think
that two axes are of particular importance, and thinking of the pro-
posed innovation regulator in the context of these axes does a fair
amount of work.
The first axis is the likelihood of recalcitrance on the part of the
executive branch decisionmakers who would respond to the innova-
tion regulator. The discussion so far suggests that the innovation reg-
ulator will propose better innovation policies than other
decisionmakers will. The question is the level of resistance we should
expect from other decisionmakers. Insofar as they will-either out of
bad faith or sincere but misplaced concerns-resist the innovation
regulator's policies, that would counsel in favor of increased power for
the innovation regulator.
This is a basic concern that arises whenever a government wants
to reorient existing behavior. If the government wants to push agency
officials to do something they were only marginally disinclined to do,
a mere recommendation, or a recommendation backed by a very mild
sanction, likely would be sufficient to overcome the officials' resis-
tance. A request that officials wear a security badge, or wash their
hands after using the bathroom, might fall into this category. If, in-
stead, there is reason to expect strong resistance on the part of agency
officials, a bigger club (in the form of greater power) might be neces-
248 National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act, Pub. L. No.
94-282, 90 Stat. 459 (1976). For a commentary that makes a suggestion along these lines, see
Merrill, supra note 242.
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sary. Effective integration of a previously segregated environment
(like the U.S. armed services before 1948), for example, might require
an integration enforcer with considerable powers to overcome recalci-
trant agency officials. 249
The second axis addresses the same general concern with respect
to the innovation regulator: to what extent is the regulator likely to be
overeager, pushing broader regulatory solutions than would be ideal?
As with the question regarding agency officials, this is a question
about the likelihood of error compared with an ideal regulatory model
that will never be obtained in reality. We know that there will be
deviations from an ideal regulatory path, but in some cases the danger
of regulatory overzealousness-whether in seeking to add regulations
or block them-will be greater than in others. Insofar as that danger
increases, it serves as an argument for reduced powers for the innova-
tion regulator.
As we have discussed, we do not favor giving our proposed OIP
blocking power. Once the possibility of OIP blocking agency action is
off the table, the danger posed by an overeager regulator is greatly
reduced. If, as we propose, OIP cannot permanently block agency ac-
tion, it-along with interest groups-will know that. As a result, in-
terest groups will have less incentive to try to capture OIP than they
would if OIP could block regulations. The benefit to controlling an
entity flows in significant part from the powers that the entity has.
Interest groups currently focus on persuading the agencies that create
regulations, and their focus would largely remain there. The absence
of a blocking power obviously means that OIP cannot altogether re-
make government policy in a fundamental way, but it also means that
it cannot deliver regulatory gains to interest groups, and that means
the danger of OIP overzealousness-and in particular overzealous-
ness in seeking to implement the wishes of interest groups-is
diminished.
Turning back to the first axis, we expect some resistance to OIP's
ideas. Agencies are familiar with the interests of those they regulate.
By and large, they have not focused on innovation per se, and have
not looked at effects of their actions on the economy as a whole (as
opposed to their slice of it). This is not surprising-indeed, it is part
of the design of agencies-but their lack of familiarity with the analy-
sis we are proposing likely will create hesitation about adopting it.
249 See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948) (ordering that "there shall be equal-
ity of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race,
color, religion or national origin").
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That said, we do not expect utter recalcitrance. The reason is that the
empirical evidence does not support the extreme vision of some public
choice theorists-that government officials will always do the bidding
of powerful interests who supply them with money, clout, or whatever
they maximize.25 0 Well-funded groups have a great deal of influ-
ence-indeed, that influence is part of the reason that we do not pro-
pose that existing entities do the innovation analysis on their own-
but influence is not control.
Still, the possibility of recalcitrance either in good faith (e.g., tun-
nel vision) or bad faith (e.g., capture) cannot be dismissed, and that
leads us to propose a mechanism through which OIP's position would
be public, and the executive branch official would be obliged to re-
spond to it publicly, even though the official would not be obliged to
implement it.
Specifically, in the case of major regulations that are currently
subject to cost-benefit review by OIRA, 0IP could provide the inno-
vation "module" of the analysis. It could provide this analysis ex post,
as part of the OIRA review, and also ex ante, through guidelines to
agencies that supplemented the current, largely static analysis in
OIRA's Circular A-4. In other contexts, where OIRA is not involved,
OIP could also issue guidelines for thinking about innovation impact.
Moreover, it could both propose new agency action and respond to
existing agency action. Agencies would be subject to a requirement
that they consider and respond to OIP's analysis. OIP's input could
not force the agency to take any particular action. Rather, the agency
would be required to consider OIP's analysis carefully, and to articu-
late a reasoned response. This response would become part of the
record to which a court would look in the event of a judicial
challenge.2 51
At its core, our proposal is for a form of review that is quite com-
mon in administrative law-"hard look" review, in which a court con-
250 See supra notes 149-50.
251 With respect to OIRA itself, the question is slightly more difficult as the executive order
that currently governs OIRA states that it does not grant judicial review of OIRA's actions (and,
relatedly, suggests that OIRA's review is not part of the record before the reviewing court). See
Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 10, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) ("Nothing in this Executive
order shall affect any otherwise available judicial review of agency action. This Executive order
is intended only to improve the internal management of the Federal Government and does not
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party
against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other
person."). So unless that order is changed, or a court finds that it can review OIRA's actions
despite the executive order, OIRA actions are not subject to judicial review.
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siders whether an agency took a hard look at all the significant
arguments and data, including those that did not support its position,
in making its policy decisions.252 If a reviewing court finds that an
agency failed to take such a hard look at an important argument or set
of data, the court rejects the agency action and remands it to the
agency for such consideration.25 3 The agency can adhere to its original
position, but it must respond to the countervailing materials.
Our proposal is that OIP's input would be submitted to the
agency and become part of the record before the agency. OIP's sub-
missions would thus qualify as material at which the agency should
take a hard look, and to which the agency would be required to re-
spond. The agency could reject OIP's position, but it could not do so
without demonstrating that it had considered OIP's ideas and analysis.
And a reviewing court would play the familiar role that it plays in
hard-look review-determining whether the agency took a hard look
at OIP's submissions to the agency and thus effectively requiring the
agency to show that it considered them.254
This is not a guarantee, of course, that the agency will in fact sin-
cerely consider OIP's input, rather than merely pay lip service to it.
But that is always the danger of any system that does not mandate
particular outcomes. And we believe the public nature of OIP's input
would be helpful. The fact that an innovation regulator was publicly
252 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(adopting hard look review); El Conejo Americano of Tex., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 278 F.3d 17,
19-20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying hard look review); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not
merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative charter,
but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals,
that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasoned decision-making." (footnote omitted)).
253 See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57 (remanding the matter to the NHTSA).
254 A court could provide a similar review of an agency's refusal to adopt an OIP proposal.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007) (stating that "[r]efusals to promulgate
rules are thus susceptible to judicial review"). It is not clear that such review is any more defer-
ential than the "arbitrary [or] capricious" review of agency actions under which courts engage in
hard look review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) ("[Tjhe reviewing court shall ... (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... "); Eric Biber, The
Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 34 (2008)
("agency inaction is subject to the same general scheme of judicial review-including deference
on issues such as expertise-as the rest of agency decisionmaking"); Dru Stevenson, Special
Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 56 (2007) (stating
that in Massachusetts v. EPA, "the Court is using stricter scrutiny than it usually would in 'hard
look' cases"). In any event, the difference between the two forms of review does not seem to be
very great.
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questioning an agency's course of action would change the regulatory
dynamic. The agency would have to articulate why the analysis put
forward by OIP was unpersuasive, and we expect that such a require-
ment would have a disciplining effect and render some arguments
harder to make.
The prospect of hard-look review by a court should be sufficient
to require agencies to take OIP's input seriously. But we also propose
an additional backstop against agency recalcitrance in the form of re-
mand of agency actions that ignore OIP's input. This backstop would
also be the relevant "stick" in cases where OIRA was involved-as we
noted above, OIRA's actions might not themselves be subject to judi-
cial hard-look review.25 5 In effect, OIP would be able to conduct its
own hard-look review, asking whether the agency (or OIRA) re-
sponded to its arguments and remanding the action if the agency
failed to do so. OIP would be able to remand only once, so that a
truly recalcitrant entity could ignore OIP's original submission and its
remand, and then promulgate its action as it saw fit (subject, of course,
to the danger of a court saying that it failed to take a hard look at
OIP's input). But that seems quite unlikely, given that the agency
could avoid all the time, energy, and litigation risk entailed in the
strategy above by demonstrating that it seriously considered and re-
sponded to OIP's analysis.2 5 6
In this regard, the empirical analysis we have done (discussed fur-
ther below) of some recent, innovation-related FCC rulemakings is
instructive.257 The FCC was persuaded by the expert submissions of
another governmental entity that addresses telecommunications pol-
icy-the NTIA-even without a formalized role for the NTIA in the
FCC's rulemaking process. Creating a formal role for OIP in agen-
cies' decisionmaking processes, complete with a requirement that
agencies take a hard look at OIP's input, will make it only more likely
that agencies will take OIP's submissions very seriously.
The example of the NTIA's comments highlights another aspect
of OIP's involvement. Like OIRA, it would participate in the
rulemaking process, rather than waiting until an agency's rulemaking
process was complete in order to give its input. Requiring OIP to wait
255 See supra note 251.
256 Indeed, we suspect that OIP would rarely have to invoke its authority to remand a
regulation for consideration of its arguments: the risk created by judicial hard look review, com-
bined with the additional risk created by the prospect of OIP remand, should be more than
sufficient to persuade an agency that the costs of compliance are smaller than the costs of
noncompliance.
257 See infra text accompanying notes 278-82; see also infra Appendix.
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(as a court must) until an agency completes its rulemaking process
might entail significant delays in the already lengthy rulemaking pro-
cess. And insofar as the agency was persuaded to change its rulemak-
ing, some of the agency's earlier work would have been for naught.
Having OIP give its input during the formation of the agency's rule
would allow for much more efficiency, and reduce the chances of
OIP's analysis adding a lengthy delay in the rulemaking process.
C. What Sort of Analysis Should OIP Undertake, and What
Procedures Should It Use?
The discussion so far in this Article gives shape to the sort of
analysis OIP would undertake. The primary bases upon which OIP
might criticize proposed agency action would be twofold. First, OIP
might find that the agency action in question was aimed at promoting
innovation, but it did so in a manner that was flawed or at cross-pur-
poses with the actions of other agencies. Second, OIP might find that
the action in question aimed to achieve a goal other than innovation,
but it could achieve that goal in a manner less damaging to innovation.
OIP would also have the important role of providing the innovation
component to OIRA's cost-benefit analysis of major regulation.
The principles that OIP would use for its analysis would be quite
parsimonious, which should also help to avoid undue delay. Again,
the idea would be not so much that individual agencies could not use
the principles, but that they would not necessarily have the motivation
and expertise to use them appropriately. The most important princi-
ple (which might, in certain cases, represent the entirety of OIP analy-
sis) would simply be whether, on balance, the proposed regulatory
action maximized the sum of innovation incentives for all innovators,
both current and future. For example, a compulsory access regime for
a particular platform technology might address blockages to optimal
improvement caused by one of the many exceptions to the "one mo-
nopoly profit"/"internalizing complementary externalities" princi-
ple.25 8 To that extent, it would improve incentives for future
innovators. On the other hand, to the extent that the compulsory
scheme undercompensated the platform innovator, it might decrease
incentives for future platform innovators (including innovators that
might come up with alternative platforms). More immediately, if the
platform were not purely a knowledge platform (for example, if it
258 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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were a physical platform such as broadband cable), compulsory access
might decrease incentives to maintain or improve the platform.
OIP's mandate would be to cast the widest possible net in terms
of gathering information relevant to application of its decision princi-
ples. OIP would seek input from other agencies-both regulatory and
funding agencies. It could also learn from nongovernment actors, in-
cluding familiar sources like think tanks and academics, along with
less familiar ones like prediction markets and other means of harnes-
sing the wisdom of crowds.259
Turning to the procedures OIP should use, in the context of
OIRA much ink has been spilled over the extent to which the applica-
ble transparency requirements are sufficiently rigorous. Relatedly, we
might ask whether administrative law requirements that are intended
to secure public input (in particular, public comments) should apply to
OIP.
With respect to transparency, the answer is clear. At a minimum,
transparency requirements similar to those imposed on OIRA during
the Clinton Administration should apply. And as we noted above,
OIP's input would be part of the record before the agency and thus
would be publicly disclosed. There is of course the question of com-
pliance. In the context of OIRA, commentators have complained that
its compliance with transparency obligations has been incomplete. 260
OIP would presumably have a greater interest in transparency than
does OIRA, however: Unlike OIRA, OIP would not be able to block
agency action, so its authority would flow from the degree to which it
could persuade others to accept its views. Because it would have
somewhat less inherent power than OIRA, OIP would need to make
greater use of the "bully pulpit."
Implicit in the discussion above are basic elements of OIP's pro-
cedures-gathering information, conducting analysis, and communi-
cating its ideas. These are the core aspects of almost any
decisionmaking process for any entity. The real question is whether
OIP's processes would include the central distinctive element of the
informal rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") 261: the requirement of a process pursuant to which members
259 See generally MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISIONMAKING (2008); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
(2004).
260 Bressman & Vanderbergh, supra note 93, at 92-93; Bagley & Revesz, supra note 112, at
1309-10.
261 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 550-596 (2006).
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of the public can comment on proposed regulations. 262 Neither agency
decisionmaking nor judicial review of agency actions requires a com-
ment process,263 so its costs and benefits in the context of innovation
regulation are worth careful consideration.
There is a longstanding debate among commentators about the
benefits of the comment process. Kenneth Culp Davis, for instance,
praised the notice-and-comment process as "one of the greatest inven-
tions of modern government," because it allows citizens to participate
in the lawmaking process.2 64 Other commentators have argued that
the influential communications to agencies occur outside the rulemak-
ing process, reducing the comment process to a sideshow. Don Elliott
famously stated that "[n]otice-and-comment rulemaking is to public
participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions-a
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of
something which in real life takes place in other venues. '265 More re-
cently, David Barron and Elena Kagan have suggested that "notice
and comment often functions as charade" and that "notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking today tends to promote a conception of the regula-
tory process as a forum for competition among interest groups, rather
than a means to further the public interest. ' 266 Thus, some commenta-
tors have suggested that the costs of the comment process exceed its
benefits.267
The central cost of the comment process is straightforward: the
agency's time in reading, assessing, and, when appropriate, responding
262 Under the APA, the comment process is triggered after the agency publishes a notice of
proposed rulemaking, at which point "the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments." 5
U.S.C. § 553(c).
263 The notice-and-comment process is important to other considerations-perhaps most
notably for determining whether Chevron deference is available under Mead-but there is no
necessary importance, as a matter of logic or governance, to having a comment process.
264 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed. Supp.
1970); see also Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J.
359, 380-81, 403 (1972) ("[I]t is not persuasive for agency staffs to argue that their presence in a
proceeding assures representation of the public interest. Since the public interest is multi-fac-
eted, separate representation of identifiable views will promote awareness of the complexities of
an issue and its potential impact.").
265 E. Donald Elliott, Comment, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
266 David Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SuP. CT. REV.
201, 231-32 (2001); see also Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 101-03 (2003) (arguing that party participation under
the APA is selective and reactive).
267 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delib-
erative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 178 (1997).
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to the various comments. Even if comments turn out to add little, the
agency has to read and assess them in order to make that determina-
tion.268  That alone is a substantial use of agency resources. Then
there is the time and energy required to demonstrate that the agency
has taken a hard look at whichever arguments and data in the com-
ments a court may later find significant and thus require an agency
response. 269
The more difficult issue involves evaluating the benefits of com-
ments. A number of researchers have looked at this question. In a
recent examination of comments submitted in three rulemakings (a
Treasury Department proposal on law enforcement use of financial
data, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposal on changing the li-
censing of nuclear plants, and a Federal Election Commission propo-
sal on financing political campaigns and party conventions), Tino
Cu6llar found that individuals' comments were less likely to be incor-
porated into the final regulation than comments made by administra-
tive attorneys. 270 Individual comments were relevant to the agencies'
legal mandates 271 but, crucially, those comments lacked the technical
sophistication to be seriously considered by the agency. 272 Even so,
Cu6llar did find that individuals' comments had some effect on the
agency's ultimate rulemaking. 273 Other researchers who have exten-
sively sampled individuals' comments are less sanguine than Cu6llar:
they have found that such comments overwhelmingly comprise form
letters and exhibit little deliberative quality.27
4
268 See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433,
436 (2004) (noting that the comment process is "hopelessly time-consuming for agency
officials").
269 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political
Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 919 (2006) (discussing these costs and noting that "[iut is one thing
to hire more comment-readers, and another entirely to require the agency officials who are craft-
ing the regulation to show that they have taken a hard look at the raft of arguments and data").
270 Mariano-Florentino Cullar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411, 417 (2005) (stating that the current system "leaves rulemaking almost entirely to agencies,
their political superiors, organizational players, and those interested parties who can write so-
phisticated comments").
271 Id. at 414 (stating that "laypeople nearly always raise concerns that are relevant to the
agency's legal mandate").
272 See id. at 479-82 (noting that "dramatic differences exist in the extent of specialized
knowledge and technical sophistication reflected in comments from organized interests versus
those from individual members of the public" and that "the sophistication with which a comment
is written seems to affect the probability that the agency will accept suggestions in that
comment").
273 See id. at 444 tbl.1, 458-59 tbl.3 (finding that some comments by individuals influenced
agencies concerning the financial privacy and nuclear regulation proposals).
274 See Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55
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For our purposes, what is important is not the comment process
generally, but its value in the context of innovation. Accordingly, we
took a close look at the comment process in three recent FCC pro-
ceedings relating to innovation, to see what role it played there.
Commentators have subjected the FCC comment process to a fair
amount of criticism. For instance, one study found that 99.8% of inde-
cency complaints originated with a single group (the Parents Televi-
sion Council).275 Others have noted the presence of comments that
are humorously fraudulent (unless one believes that Joseph Stalin,
Jesus Christ, and Paris Hilton are submitting comments to the FCC27 6)
and less humorously fraudulent, in the form of form-letter comments
DUKE L.J. 943, 951 (2006) (noting that a study of significant EPA hazardous waste rules from
1989 to 1991 showed that a small percentage of comments submitted were from individuals and
of those comments that were from individuals "most were only the briefest of letters"); David
Schlosberg et al., 'To Submit a Form or Not to Submit a Form, That Is the (Real) Question':
Deliberation and Mass Participation in U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking 15 (May 5, 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://www.online-deliberation.net/conf2005lviewabstract.php?
id=14); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory
Rulemaking, 3 J. E-Gov'T 41, 45 (2006) (noting that individuals have overwhelmingly sent form
letters, or form letters with an additional sentence or two that adds no new rationales, data, or
arguments that the agency would not have already received, and stating that "the emergence of
first generation electronic rulemaking has had the singular effect of increasing the flood of dupli-
cative, often insubstantial, mass mailing campaigns"); J. Woody Stanley & Christopher Weare,
The Effects of Internet Use on Political Participation: Evidence from an Agency Online Discussion
Forum, 36 ADMIN. & Soc. 503, 517 (2004) (finding in a study of an agency's rulemakings that
most comments posted were in the mold of form letters); Jerry Brito & Jerry Ellig, Net Neutral-
ity: Where's the Beef?, TCS DAILY, July 24, 2007, http://www.tcsdaily.com/printArticle.aspx?ID=
071807K (noting that in a proceeding asking for evidence discrimination by broadband Internet
companies, "[c]lose to 10,000 comments were submitted to the FCC, yet all but 143 were what
the FCC calls 'brief text comments,' many of which were form letters generated at the behest of
advocacy groups. Of the 143 more extensive comments, only 66 are longer than two pages.").
In fact, agencies often note as much in their discussion of comments. See, e.g., Manufac-
tured Home Construction and Safety Standards on Wind Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 2456, 2460
(Jan. 14, 1994) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3280, 3282) ("The great majority of the comments
were duplicative or identical form letters (of the 1116 total comments, only 75 to 100 included
distinctive comments)."); Drawbridge Operation Regulations; Chincoteague Channel,
Chincoteague, VA, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,669, 66,671 (Nov. 16, 2006) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
117) ("The comments included 540 letters, one petition, two e-mail comments, and 14 oral re-
marks presented at the public meeting. The vast majority of the letters (471) were mass-pro-
duced form letters signed by residents.").
275 See Todd Shields, Activists Dominate Content Complaints, MEDIAWEEK.COM, Dec. 6,
2004, available at http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/esearch/article-display.jsp?vnu-contentid=
1000731871.
276 See Matthew Lasar, Faux Celebrity FCC Filings on the Rise, LASAR's LETTER ON THE
FCC (LLFCC), Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.lasarletter.net/drupal/node/522 (noting comments
from those three, plus Donald Trump, who discussed his hairpiece, Leon Trotsky, signed as
"Leon Trotsky, 6 feet under," President George Bush, and "Mr. or Ms. 'Fuck the FCC,' who
wrote to express outrage at having his/her first name banned from radio and television").
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written by powerful incumbents and submitted in the name of individ-
uals who, when contacted by a reporter, said they had no involvement
with the comments sent in their names.277
We went beyond these critiques and focused on the comment
process in rulemakings involving: media ownership rules; proposals
for broadband Internet services over power lines; and the use of
"white spaces" in the broadcast spectrum (frequencies used as buffers
and thus not occupied by transmitters) by new services.2 78 All three of
these proceedings attracted significant public interest and large num-
bers of comments from individual citizens. We chose them on the the-
ory that the increased amount of public comment was likely to present
the strongest case of individuals' impact on the rulemaking process.
Many commentators over the years have noted that the vast majority
of rulemakings attract few or no individual comments, and that the
comment process is thus dominated by insiders.2 79 We chose rulemak-
ings where this "insider" phenomenon was least evident, because
277 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Kim Hart, Constituents' E-Mail on XM Deal Not Well Received,
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2007, at D1 ("A check by The Washington Post of 60 people whose names
were attached to identical, anti-merger e-mails instigated by the National Association of Broad-
casters, a major opponent of the [XM and Sirius] merger, produced mostly unanswered phone
calls and recordings saying the phones were disconnected. Of the 10 people reached, nine said
they never sent anything to the FCC, and only one said she remembered filling out something
about Sirius but did not recall taking a position on a merger.").
This concern is not limited to agencies. A 2005 poll of 350 congressional staffers found that
half of them believed that form-letter messages were sent without the knowledge or approval of
constituents. Id. This poll also showed that:
House and Senate offices last year received 318 million electronic messages, up
from 200 million e-mails and postal letters in 2004. A large number of those e-
mails were produced through interest group Web sites, a standard lobbying prac-
tice. Lawmakers are so frustrated with the volume of missives thrown off by those
sites that many are placing obstacles in the way of e-mails not written personally by
constituents. Barriers include requiring e-mailers to fill out a special form on
lawmakers' Web sites and to complete a simple math problem to get their e-mails
through.
Id.
278 See Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broad. Bands, 21 F.C.C.R. 12,266 (2006); Amend-
ment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement Guidelines for Access Broad-
band over Power Line Sys., 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265 (2004); 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-
Review of the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Sec-
tion 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003). All public comments associ-
ated with all three rulemakings are accessible via the FCC's Web site. See FCC, Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS), http:llwww.fcc.govlcgblecfsl (last visited Oct. 19, 2008). See
infra note 297 for more details on the proceedings.
279 See Coglianese, supra note 274, at 951-59 (discussing multiple studies finding few if any
comments by individuals in sampled agency proceedings).
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members of the public indeed submitted comments in significant
numbers.
As to each proceeding, we examined who submitted comments to
the FCC; how often those comments were inconsistent with the eco-
nomic interests of the commenters; how often the comments con-
tained arguments or information that was not contained in earlier
comments; whose comments the FCC responded to in its resulting or-
der; and whose comments the FCC agreed with in its resulting
order.28 0
The details of our results are set out in the Appendix. But our
conclusions are not encouraging. We found that comments were sub-
mitted disproportionately by well-organized groups. These included
lobbyists for corporations, public interest groups, and groups of like-
minded citizens. This last category was sometimes quite significant
numerically. There were more than 1000 (out of roughly 6000) com-
ments against broadband-over-power-lines by members of the Ameri-
can Radio Relay League, who opposed the new service because they
thought it would interfere with their ham radio communications.
There were also hundreds of thousands of comments against the pro-
posed media ownership rules by citizens, the vast majority of whom
were responding to organized email campaigns.
None of the comments was against the economic interests of the
relevant commenters. This is not surprising-why would we expect
commenters to go to the trouble of commenting if they would be
pushing a result that was not in their interest?-but it does highlight
the potentially limited value of many comments, unless they introduce
new information.
And that leads to our next finding, which is that the vast majority
of comments from private and public interest groups, and virtually all
the comments from private citizens (which were mainly form letters),
were duplicative of comments that had already been submitted. 281 In
280 The first three variables represent a measure of the quality of the submissions. The last
two variables speak to their influence in the FCC process. Quality is of course distinct from
influence-for example, it may be that comment quality is very high but the agency (hampered
by tunnel vision, capture, or some other reason) nonetheless chooses to ignore such high-quality
comments. Even so, it is worth measuring influence, if only because it gives us some sense of
whether a realistic regulator (as opposed to an idealized one) is likely to be influenced by notice
and comment.
281 Of the roughly 6000 comments submitted in the broadband-over-power-line proceeding,
more than 5000 were submitted by ham radio operators (many organized by the American Ra-
dio Relay League), virtually all of which simply reiterated complaints that broadband over
power lines would create interference. Of the more than one million comments submitted in the
media ownership proceeding, more than 99% were short statements of opposition that contained
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contrast to the literal duplication entailed in form letters, the com-
ments from organized interest groups used different words and differ-
ent phrasing. But when we looked closely at the substance of the
points that commenters made, we found a very high degree of duplica-
tion. The words differed, but the arguments did not.2 82
We discuss the FCC's response to the comments at some length in
the Appendix. Here we present the bottom line from our examina-
tion of the comments and the FCC's response to them: With the nota-
ble exception of input by the NTIA, the comment process yielded
little more than we might expect from a bare-bones lobbying process.
The ideas and information that seemed important (both to us in read-
ing the comments and to the FCC in responding to them) could be
no new arguments (and often no meaningful arguments at all, but instead a statement of
opposition).
This was not a surprise with respect to the comments submitted by individuals. As we noted
earlier, see supra note 274 and accompanying text, studies examining individual comments sub-
mitted in rulemaking proceedings as a whole have found that the vast majority are simple form
letters. Similarly, examinations of individuals' comments specifically on the media ownership
rules have found that they were quite general, picking up on points made repeatedly by others,
and that a huge number were form letters. See Michael A. McGregor, When the "Public Inter-
est" Is Not What Interests the Public, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 207, 222-23 (2006) (observing in a
review of the same comments submitted in the same media ownership proceeding that "[m]uch
of the information provided in these comments was quite general" and that there were a "large
number of form comments filed"); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating the Federal Communica-
tions Commission's National Television Ownership Cap: What's Bad for Broadcasting Is Good
for the Country, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 461 (2004) (noting in a study of the same com-
ments that "there were over 750,000 comments submitted to the FCC, but most of these were
short form letters that did not discuss any of the limits in detail"). In its media ownership order,
the FCC stated that it "received more than 500,000 brief comments and form letters from indi-
vidual citizens" that simply "expressed general concerns about the potential consequences of
media consolidation." In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,624 (2003).
282 For example, in both the white-spaces and broadband-over-power-line proceedings
many commenters claimed that allowing the proposed services would create significant and
therefore unacceptable levels of interference. For instance, virtually all of the 5000 comments by
ham radio operators in the broadband-over-power-line proceeding made this point. Some of
these comments presented specific data about interference, but many others simply stated that
interference would arise and would cause problems. This is not surprising, as a fear of interfer-
ence is the most commonly cited concern for existing users of the spectrum who want to argue
against allowing a new use. They know that asking for relief from competition will not be
treated as a public-regarding argument, but that a concern about interference will. Accordingly,
incumbents almost always express concerns about interference. The result is that a fear of inter-
ference is stated and restated, even if the additional statements add nothing to the original point.
This is not to say that the duplicative comments had no value, but instead that whatever value
they had was not in the form of putting forth new ideas.
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expected to be made by any given lobbyist on a particular side of the
issue. All the other comments on the same side added little.
The results of the available theoretical and empirical work, in-
cluding our own, strongly suggest that an APA-style comment process
is not essential, or even particularly helpful, for purposes of improving
innovation regulation.2 18 3
D. How Would It Be Created?
One big advantage of our proposal over other possible mecha-
nisms for improving innovation policy is that it can be implemented by
executive order. The President can (and often does) create new of-
fices via executive order, and giving a new office the authority to sub-
mit materials to agencies raises no constitutional issues.284 Executive
orders do not ordinarily include language about judicial hard-look re-
view. An executive order creating OIP could include such language,
but it would not need to. Courts apply hard-look review to all sub-
stantial and important arguments and data supplied to an agency, and
it seems quite likely that courts would treat comments from a govern-
ment office focusing on innovation as material and deserving of hard-
look review, whether or not there was an executive order (or, for that
matter legislation) containing a hard-look mandate.2 85
The only constitutional concern raised by an OIP created through
executive order would involve the President's ability to authorize OIP
to remand regulations back to independent agencies. Some executive
orders on federal regulation have refrained from giving entities like
283 Some have argued that the value of comments in the rulemaking process could be in-
creased via various changes to the process. Proposed changes might allow for collaboration
among commenters (perhaps like Wikipedia) and/or ratings of comments (perhaps like Slashdot,
in which users rate the quality of others' submissions, and the raters themselves are rated for the
quality of their ratings). One of us focused on these questions in a different article and came to
the conclusion that such an increase in the value of comments is unlikely, for several reasons-
perhaps most notably that collaboration and ratings systems do not work well in contexts where
policy preferences loom large. See Benjamin, supra note 269, at 924-32. The other of us be-
lieves that these "open source"-type approaches to improving notice and comment may have
value, but that it would be premature to impose even potentially improved notice and comment
procedures on an OIP before their value had been proved in other, more conventional rulemak-
ing contexts.
284 Indeed, the EPA, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 40 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2008), reprinted in
84 Stat. 2086 (1970), and a host of other entities were created via executive order.
285 Legislation specifying that agencies must give a hard look to OIP submissions would
make an agency's failure to take a hard look an independent statutory violation. But courts
already require agency hard-look review as a matter of statutory construction (specifically, the
Administrative Procedure Act's prohibition on "arbitrary [or] capricious" agency action), see 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006), so specific congressional legislation would be redundant.
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OIRA the ability to block regulations issued by independent agencies,
authorizing such power only with respect to executive agency regula-
tions.286 However, there is no case law holding that giving an entity
created by executive order the power to block independent agencies'
regulations would be unconstitutional.287 In any event, we are not
proposing a veto (which OIRA effectively has), but instead what
amounts to a delay. Recall that 0IP can remand only once and can-
not force the agency to do anything, so an agency that refused even to
read OIP's input would be subject only to a delay in promulgating its
regulation.2 88 The weight of commentary indicates that such a proce-
dure would not violate the separation of powers, and we agree. 289 So
286 See Michele Estrin Gilman, If at First You Don't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order:
President Bush and the Expansion of Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1103, 1154
(2007) (noting that Reagan's regulatory-review executive order did not apply to independent
agencies, whereas Clinton's executive order applied the procedural, but not the substantive, re-
view requirements to independent agencies).
287 See HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 167-97 (2006).
288 Such a regulation would likely flunk a court's hard-look review, but that would be the
judiciary, not the executive, effectively blocking the agency's action.
289 Full discussion of the issues bound up in this question would require a separate law
review article, and in fact the subject has already occupied many law review articles. Some
commentators have argued that the best understanding of the President's powers is that he has
the same (great) control over independent agencies that he has over executive agencies, and
others have argued with equal conviction that the President has quite limited authority over
independent agencies, and still others have occupied virtually every position in between. See
BRUFF, supra note 287, at 412-59 (discussing this debate). We will not attempt to canvass the
matter here, but rather will simply note that the arguments put forward by most recent commen-
tators appear to endorse the permissibility of the fairly modest authority we propose-that there
are no constitutional impediments to executive orders that require agencies, including indepen-
dent agencies, to seriously consider policies that the President deems important. See Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, Recommendation No. 88-9, Presidential Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-9 n.3 (1993) (articulating presidential review as "a pro-
gram of systematic executive oversight and dialogue that involves coordinating agency actions
where conflicts exist, and in all cases probing the agency's fact and policy judgments, with the
purpose of ensuring that the agency considers factors of importance to the President's policies to
the extent permitted by law"); James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of
the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 853 (2001);
Kagan, supra note 93, at 2383-84 (arguing that an increased presidential role in regulation "both
satisfies legal requirements and promotes the values of administrative accountability and effec-
tiveness"); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Exec-
utive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 730 (2005) (noting that "every
president between 1945 and 2004 defended the unitariness of the executive branch with suffi-
cient ardor to rebuff any claims that institutions such as independent counsels and independent
agencies have been sanctioned as a matter of constitutional custom or history"); cf. Cynthia R.
Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 987, 987-89 (1997) (arguing that the increased regulatory role of the President that has
emerged since the 1980s is "fatally flawed"); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-
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although Congress could eliminate any question by passing legislation
giving this power to 0IP, we do not believe that would be necessary.
The advantage of having an 0IP that can be created by executive
order is quite significant. Indeed, creation through executive order
makes it much more likely that an effective OIP will in fact be cre-
ated. First, there is the simple fact that it is easier to persuade the
President to promulgate a policy than to persuade veto-proof majori-
ties in the House and Senate, and is a fortiori easier to persuade the
President than to persuade non-veto-proof majorities of the House
and Senate plus the President.
Second, there is widespread agreement that the President is more
politically accountable to the national public than Congress. Political
accountability flows from the fact that the President is elected by a
national electorate and Congress is not: small, powerful interests
likely will have disproportionate influence in individual districts and
states, but are more likely to cancel each other out at the national
level. 290 Relatedly, the President has greater reason to be concerned
KENT L. REV. 965, 968 (1997) (contending that President Clinton's significant role in rulemaking
"insufficiently respects the tension inherent in the Constitution between Congress's power to
create the instruments of government and allocate authority among them and the fact of a single
chief executive at the head of the agencies thus created, with intended and inevitable political
relationships with all").
290 See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 152 (1997) ("[Tlhe voter
chooses a representative for that representative's effectiveness in supplying governmental goods
to the local district .... The president has no particular constituency to which he or she has
special responsibility to deliver benefits."); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for
the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35 (1995) ("Representing as he does a national elec-
toral college majority, the President at least has an incentive to steer national resources toward
the 51% of the nation that last supported him (and that might support him again), thereby
mitigating the bad distributional incentives faced by members of Congress."); Kagan, supra note
93, at 2260, 2331-37 (arguing that the President is more broadly representative and that congres-
sional oversight is reactive because triggered by party complaints; "because the President has a
national constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative policy on
an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial interests");
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 93, at 105-06 ("[B]ecause the President has a national constitu-
ency-unlike relevant members of Congress, who oversee independent agencies with often paro-
chial agendas-it appears to operate as an important counterweight to factional influence over
administration."); DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 1081 (stating that centralized executive
branch review "encourages policy coordination, greater political accountability, and more bal-
anced regulatory decisions").
Jide Nzefibe has argued that this conventional wisdom is overstated, because the Electoral
College opens the door to a President subject to faction. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the National-
ist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1231-46 (2006). But even
Nzelibe does not argue that Congress is less subject to capture by narrow interests than the
President is. Rather, he simply argues that the President may be no better than Congress in
resisting "faction." In any event, we believe that because innovation costs and benefits are par-
ticularly likely to be geographically concentrated (because centers of innovation are often clus-
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about the overall health of the national economy than do members of
Congress, given their narrower constituencies.2 91 And the innovation
with which we are concerned may well negatively affect some regions
of the country even as it helps others (the costs and benefits of innova-
tion often are geographically lumpy). Simply stated, we agree with
the predominant view that the President's broader electoral constitu-
ency makes him more responsive to majoritarian preferences than
Congress. The President can be captured by narrow interests, of
course, but as we have noted the question is a comparative one among
different institutional actors.292 And in comparison Congress fares
much worse. As a result, creation of an innovation regulator via exec-
utive order is the most attractive, and feasible, path.
It also bears noting both that our proposed OIP should face less
danger of capture than other institutions and that the absolute danger
of such capture would be reasonably low. We have already noted two
reasons for this: it will not be able to block regulations, and it will
have both an obligation and an incentive to operate transparently. 293
But another reason is significant as well: OIP's broad scope will make
capture more difficult, and therefore less likely. The classic case of
capture arises when an agency (or congressional committee) covers
one or two industries. The major incumbents from those industries
can band together and exert a huge amount of influence. That is the
story, for instance, with respect to broadcasters' decades-long influ-
ence at the FCC. An entity that takes a cross-cutting approach to all
regulation is less subject to the power of a few major stakeholders
precisely because there will not be a few major stakeholders. Some of
the entities affected by OIP will of course be powerful, but they will
also be diffuse and they will not be repeat players, making it less likely
tered in particular areas, and the industries they reshape or displace are often similarly
clustered), the concerns about Congress's parochialism are particularly salient. See generally G.
Pascal Zachary, When It Comes to Innovation, Geography Is Destiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/business/yourmoney/llping.html?-r=l&scp=l&
sq=Zachary,%20When%20it%2oComes%20to%20Innovation&st=cse&oref=slogin (on cluster-
ing of innovation industries); KAREN G. MILLS, ELISABETH B. REYNOLDS & ANDREW REAMER,
CLUSTERS AND COMPETITIVENESS: A NEW FEDERAL ROLE FOR STIMULATING REGIONAL ECON-
OMIES (2008) (identifying and discussing the centrality of clusters, involving innovation as well as
other industries).
291 See John 0. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J.
901, 922-23 (2001) (noting that the President has more reason to care about the national econ-
omy than do members of Congress, because of his electorate and the imperatives created by
public interest in the national economy in an election year).
292 See supra Part III.A.
293 See supra text accompanying note 260.
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that they will find it worth their time and energy to organize them-
selves much better than citizens' groups are organized. Thus the logic
of collective action should not produce the results that we see with
more narrowly focused regulators.
Conclusion
In this Article we address a perennial question of considerable
significance: what are the best strategies for modifying existing institu-
tional arrangements so that they produce a greater focus on a signifi-
cant issue that is likely to be slighted by ordinary political processes?
We consider that question in the innovation context, because we think
that answering the question in the abstract is of limited usefulness,
and because we think innovation and its regulation are particularly
important. Different policy goals will call for different considerations,
but the tools of analysis will be similar no matter the policy goal. Thus
our focus is on innovation, but we believe that our Article sheds light
on the analysis that any commentator should undertake when consid-
ering how to modify government structures.
There is no perfect answer. Having Congress pass legislation
making innovation the paramount goal of relevant agencies-or set-
ting up a single agency focused on innovation that would subsume ex-
isting agencies-would be undesirable. Innovation is an important
consideration but should not be the only one. In any event, any pro-
posal that entails legislation changing a group of organic acts is unreal-
istic. Once Congress begins tinkering with specific language in
organic statutes, powerful interests will work hard to shape specific
language to suit their goals. Every powerful interest will push for spe-
cific language with respect to a given agency that suits its interests.
In contrast to the undesirability (and slim chance) of Congress
enacting legislation, it seems realistic to posit the creation of an OIP
via executive order. As we noted at the end of the last Part, persuad-
ing the President is easier than persuading Congress, and the Presi-
dent is less subject to capture than is Congress.
When we turn to the amount of power to grant to OIP, there are
no easy answers. There is a range of power and authority that the
President could confer on OIP. The more power the President gives,
the greater the changes OIP can make, for good or ill. There is no
ineluctable level of power for OIP, but our guiding principle is to give
OIP enough authority to be able to have a significant positive impact
on innovation policy without giving it so much power that it can run
roughshod over the other agencies.
2008]
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We believe that our proposed structure for innovation policy is
more likely than any other to produce desirable results, and we be-
lieve that OIP will in fact produce such results. But we also recognize
that there is a danger that OIP, like any other human institution, can
go seriously awry, and end up doing more harm than good. We be-
lieve this is an unlikely result, but we cannot rule it out. This possibil-
ity leads us to err on the side of modest powers for OIP, in a spirit of
experimentation. We want to give OIP sufficient power to have the
experiment be meaningful, and to be able to continue indefinitely if it
works out well. 294 But we are wary about giving it broad powers be-
yond that, in light of the possibility that our prediction of its value
proves wrong. It is this spirit of humility and experimentation, com-
bined with our measured confidence about the value of OIP, that
leads us to our proposal.
Some might question the significance of our proposal. Isn't creat-
ing OIP a fairly small change to the system? Certainly, adding OIP to
the existing mix is a smaller change than jettisoning the existing sub-
stantive agencies in favor of a new agency with authority to regulate,
and increase, innovation in all fields. But we believe our proposal will
significantly change the regulatory environment. First, an entity fo-
cused on innovation would add an important new voice to the regula-
tory conversation. There would now be an entity speaking clearly and
forthrightly on the centrality of innovation. Second, and more impor-
tant, OIP would not merely have a voice: it would be able to remand
agency actions that harm innovation. It would also have as part of its
mission proposing regulation that benefits innovation. This is no
small matter. Indeed, it would change the regulatory playing field
overnight.
To those who might oppose an OIP on the grounds that making
predictions about the future is very difficult-and experts are often
wrong when they make such predictions-our response is straightfor-
ward: Agencies are already making predictions about the future
(whether consciously or not) when they make laws that affect innova-
tion. They are simply doing so in a manner that is unsystematic, hap-
hazard, and subject to undue influence by well-funded incumbents.
We can do better.
294 If our confidence in OIP were lower, we would propose a time limit, with a sunset
provision to shut down OIP after a given number of years (unless it was renewed).
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Appendix
An important part of our analysis, and the most difficult to quan-
tify, involves the FCC's response to comments. The ideal result would
demonstrate the persuasive power of certain comments as opposed to
others. To prove that a given comment pushed the agency from its
initial position to a different one-not merely that the FCC relied on a
comment to support a position it had reached independently, but that
the comment's persuasive power actually caused the FCC to change
its position-would be enormously significant. It is also impossible.
Until we can administer a reliable truth serum to agency deci-
sionmakers, we will never know what actually persuaded them.
But there are data short of a truth serum that shed light on the
agency's processes. We know: who submitted comments in given pro-
ceedings, the contents of the comments, which comments the FCC re-
sponded to, and how the FCC responded.
As we noted in the text, we conducted a careful examination of
three innovation-related rulemakings that generated large numbers of
public comments, involving media ownership rules, broadband-ser-
vices-over-power-lines, and new uses for "white spaces" in the broad-
cast spectrum.295 In the text, we discuss our findings with respect to
who submitted comments (largely organized groups and individuals
loosely affiliated with such groups), whether the comments were con-
295 See sources cited supra note 278. The "White Spaces" proceeding (formally "Unli-
censed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands") involved the use of spectrum between licensed
television stations. The benefits included the capability of long-distance wireless Internet broad-
casts and the possibility of enhanced services from traditional television broadcasters. The de-
bate in the comments centered on the possibility of increased interference, with television
networks and broadcasters lobbying for the avoidance of the use of white-space spectrum during
the digital television transition.
The "broadband over power line" proceeding involved the transmission of broadband In-
ternet signals over traditional power lines. The ability to transmit these signals over traditional,
or even slightly modified, power lines would have eliminated the need for the extensive telecom-
munications infrastructure commonly found in urban areas. This lessened need for a fiber-optic
"backbone" would have facilitated the use of broadband-over-power-line technology in rural
areas, which generally lag behind urban areas in telecommunications services, leading to the
"digital divide." Amateur radio operators, who were already exposed to interference from
power lines, claimed here that by their licensed status they were entitled to protection from the
additional interference that may result from this additional use of power lines.
The media ownership proceeding entailed a broad review of media ownership rules. It re-
sulted in the promulgation of rules to permit certain combinations of cross-ownership for televi-
sion stations, radio stations, and newspapers; to relax the limits on ownership of local television
stations; to slightly tighten the rules on local radio ownership; and to increase the national televi-
sion station ownership limit. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Comm'n's
Broad. Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms.
Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,668, 13,711-13, 13,747, 13,814-15 (2003).
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sistent with the interests of the commenters (they always were), and
whose comments did or did not contain original ideas (the comments
from organized groups tended to contain such ideas, while the com-
ments from individuals were near-universally duplicative of other
comments) 296
Here we present in detail our findings regarding whose comments
the FCC responded to, whose arguments the FCC accepted, and
whose arguments the FCC rejected. For the broadband and white
spaces proceedings, we conducted detailed counts of who submitted
comments, whose comments the FCC responded to, and whose argu-




Broadband over power lines proceeding
Individuals 7151 0 7
Citizens' groups 71 3 30
Business/professional interests 175 23 90
Government entities 28 18 14
Other 6 0 0
White spaces proceeding
Individuals 11,046 0 0
Citizens' groups 23 0 4
Business/professional interests 381 20 81
Government entities 17 3 3
Other 3 0 0
Our data yield several useful insights. First, nothing in the FCC's
orders indicated that individuals' comments had any impact on the
FCC's conclusions. While proving a negative is difficult, the absence
of evidence of any form of impact of individuals' comments is striking.
Commission orders routinely specify arguments made in comments
and then either accept or reject those arguments. Dozens of com-
ments are identified in this way in any given order. In all three of the
proceedings we studied, individuals submitted many comments: 7151
in the broadband proceeding, 11,046 in the white-spaces proceeding,
and more than 500,000 in the media ownership proceeding. In the
296 See supra text accompanying notes 278-83.
297 The extremely large number of comments submitted in the media ownership proceeding
(upwards of 500,000 from individuals alone) made tabulating counts for that proceeding
impractical.
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white-spaces proceeding, the dominant portion of individual com-
menters advocated the continued protection of broadcast television.
In its order, the Commission referred to similar arguments made by
broadcasters but never mentioned comments by any individuals or
gave any appearance of being affected by them. In the broadband-
over-power-lines proceeding, the dominant portion of individual com-
menters comprised amateur radio operators. The good news for these
individual commenters was that the FCC's order did not entirely ig-
nore them: it did briefly note the comments of some amateur radio
operators.2 98 The bad news was that the FCC rejected their
arguments.2 99
Perhaps most striking, however, was the FCC's reaction to indi-
viduals' comments in the media ownership proceeding, 99.9 percent of
which opposed the proposed rules.300 The order's only reference to
those comments was as follows:
We received more than 500,000 brief comments and form let-
ters from individual citizens. These individual commenters
298 The entirety of the order's reference to individuals' comments appeared at the end of a
paragraph discussing concerns raised by the American Radio Relay League. The order stated
that "[t]his concern is echoed in filings from individual Amateur operators" and appended a
footnote saying, "See, e.g., comments of David Garnier; Edwin S. Toal; John E. Matz; Richard E.
Polivka; Thomas D. Cox, etc." Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Mea-
surement Guidelines for Access Broadband over Power Line Sys., 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265, 21,309 &
n.213 (2004). In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the broadband-over-power-lines pro-
ceeding (which was preceded by a Notice of Inquiry, producing comments to the FCC before it
issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), the FCC actually quoted the arguments of two indi-
vidual commenters before rejecting them. See Carrier Current Systems, Including Broadband
over Power Line Sys., 19 F.C.C.R. 3335, 3342 (2004).
299 See Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement Guidelines
for Access Broadband over Power Line Sys., 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265, 21,310 (2004); Carrier Current
Systems, Including Broadband over Power Line Sys., 19 F.C.C.R. 3335, 3336, 3347-48 (2004).
300 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[N]early two
million people weighed in by letters, postcards, e-mails, and petitions to oppose further relaxa-
tion of the [media ownership] rules."). As Commissioner Copps stated in his dissent to the
Commission's order (when the comments had not yet topped the one-million mark):
This proceeding has generated three-quarters of a million comments now-more
than any other proceeding that I am aware of in the history of the FCC. Of those
comments, all but a few hundred are from individual citizens. And of those, nearly
every one opposes increased media consolidation-over 99.9 percent!
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership Rules and
Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R.
13,620, 13,951 (2003) (Copps, Michael J., Comm'r, dissenting), available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchlDOC-235047A9.pdf; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, Com-
ments Showed Solid Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at C8 ("More than 520,000 comments
on the proceeding were sent in by citizens. . . . [N]early all of them were against relaxing the
media ownership rules.").
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expressed general concerns about the potential conse-
quences of media consolidation, including concerns that such
consolidation would result in a significant loss of viewpoint
diversity and affect competition. We share the concerns of
these commenters that our ownership rules protect our criti-
cal diversity and competition goals, as they are designed to
do, and we believe that the rules adopted herein serve our
public interest goals, take account of and protect the vibrant
media marketplace, and comply with our statutory responsi-
bilities and limits. 301
The references to "brief comments and form letters" and to the
"general concerns" they contained indicate fairly little FCC regard for
those comments, a conclusion reinforced by the FCC's actions in the
proceeding: the Commission promulgated its media ownership rules
largely in the form it had proposed, by precisely the three-to-two vote
everyone expected.30 2 The overwhelming sentiment against the rules
in the comments submitted by individuals-and the specific points
made in those comments-appears to have had no effect.303
301 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Comm'n's Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 18
F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,624 (2003).
302 See Benjamin, supra note 269, at 908.
303 A study of the FCC's public hearings regarding its recent reconsideration of its media
ownership rules found a similar pattern. See Jonathan A. Obar & Amit M. Schejter, Inclusion or
Illusion?: An Analysis of the FCC's Public Hearings on Media Ownership 2006-2007, at 2 (Mar.
4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1102764) (analyzing all 732 comments at the FCC's 2006 and 2007 hearings reconsidering its
ownership rules and finding that 52.6 percent were against media consolidation and/or deregula-
tion, while only 1.4 percent were in support, and noting that the public seems to have had little
impact: in the resulting Report & Order "hardly any reference is made to public comment from
the hearings").
A more recent example is also notable. The transition to digital television opened up 108
megahertz of "beachfront spectrum" (i.e., frequencies with very desirable propagation character-
istics)-an amount of valuable spectrum that might never be freed up again. This led to an
enormous interest in the regulatory regime that the FCC would create, leading to more than
250,000 comments filed by individuals in the FCC's rulemaking proceeding on the regulations it
would adopt. Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, 22 F.C.C.R.
15,289, 15,359 n.434, 15,483 app. A (2007). The entirety of the FCC's acknowledgment of and
response to those comments was contained in two places: First, in footnote 434, after a string
cite, the order stated, "In addition, approximately 250,000 individual citizens filed brief com-
ments both during and after the formal comment periods asking the Commission to ensure that
large corporations will not stifle competition and innovation in Internet markets over U.S. air-
waves, and to set aside at least 30 MHz of spectrum for open and non-discriminatory Internet
access." Id. at 15,359 n.434. And second, in Appendix A to the order, listing the commenters,
the order stated: "This is a list of parties who filed comments and reply comments within the
designated comment periods in the proceeding. This list does not include approximately 250,000
individual citizens who filed brief comments both during and after the formal comment periods.
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The FCC's failure to respond to individuals' comments (other
than to dismiss or reject them) may reflect the point we made in the
text-namely, that there was nothing substantively new in any of
them. It bears emphasis, though, that the Commission seems to have
been completely unmoved by the simple fact that so many individuals
took the time to comment on the issue-and indeed, that such a large
majority of those individuals supported the same side in the rulemak-
ing. Simply stated, the role of individuals' comments in shaping the
agency's rulemaking appears to be somewhere between trivial and
nil.304
A second notable insight from our data is that the FCC's re-
sponse to the comments submitted by individuals stands in contrast to
its response to comments submitted by parties other than individuals.
The FCC's orders often noted information or arguments advanced in
non-individuals' comments; and when it did so it responded to them,
Of these 250,000 comments, approximately 225,000 were compiled and filed as reply comments
by MoveOn.org Civic Action. Approximately 25,000 others were filed as 'Email Comments' to
the Commission." Id. at 15,483 app. A. So, the more than 250,000 comments by individuals did
not even merit their own footnote in the order-just the latter part of a footnote containing
citations to other arguments. Id. And nowhere in the order does the Commission suggest that it
took any particular notice of those comments. Id.
304 There are reasonable bases for the Commission's reaction. First, independent agencies
were designed to be run by technocrats who were guided by their expertise and insulated from
political considerations and popular pressure. See LANDIS, supra note 132, at 28. The desirabil-
ity of an agency acting in this technocratic manner has long been the subject of debate among
commentators, but it certainly seems reasonable (though not compelled) for an expert agency
like the FCC to make decisions on that basis. Compare id., with Gellhorn, supra note 264, at 403
(arguing for greater citizen involvement in agency decisionmaking because the singular focus of
each agency does not adequately represent the public interest as a whole), and Arthur Earl
Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants,
Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 541 (1970) (discussing the value of public influ-
ence over the rulemaking process as a way of informing agencies and providing adequate safe-
guards for private interests). Congress can always countermand the agency if there is
widespread public opposition.
Second, even assuming that individuals' reactions were an important consideration, it is not
at all clear what category of individuals should be counted for this purpose. Should it be the
public as a whole, or only those who care about the issue? If the answer is the former, then
broad-based polls would seem to better reflect the relevant constituency than would the com-
ments by those who took the time and trouble to submit their views.
Third, even assuming that the focus was on those who cared about the issue, it is still not
clear that individual commenters are a good proxy, because a large percentage of individual
comments are prompted (if not scripted) by campaigns launched by interest groups, and it would
be quite surprising if the ability and energy required to organize such campaigns was distributed
among interest groups in such a way as to reflect the proportions of concerned individuals who
are on each side of an issue. See Benjamin, supra note 269, at 903-08, 933-35 (discussing how
the advent of e-rulemaking merely resulted in a larger quantity of comments advocating the
same viewpoints).
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accepting or rejecting them, often explicitly. 3 5 In the broadband-
over-power-lines proceeding, the Commission specifically addressed
178 arguments advanced in 274 comments submitted on behalf of bus-
iness organizations, trade associations, well-organized citizens' groups,
professional associations, and federal, state, and local government en-
tities. And in the white-spaces proceeding, the Commission addressed
111 arguments advanced in 421 such comments.
What is perhaps most interesting about the FCC's response to the
various parties' comments is that the FCC did not consistently favor
one position, or one set of parties. There were powerful interest
groups on both sides of each of the matters at issue in these three
proceedings, and in none of them did any group get everything it
wanted, or even close to it. The outcome in each proceeding did
please one side more than the other. This is particularly true of the
media ownership proceeding, where the FCC sided with the interests
of large media companies much more than it did with their oppo-
nents. 306 But in each of the three orders, including the media owner-
ship order, the Commission was careful to use language indicating that
it rejected some arguments made by each side.307
A final notable point from our study involves the FCC's treat-
ment of the comments submitted by one particular group: the NTIA.
The NTIA and the FCC have a somewhat awkward relationship, in
that, although they work together to determine what parts of the spec-
trum will be reserved for federal government use, the NTIA manages
all the spectrum assigned to the government, leaving no role for the
FCC in that arena.308 The NTIA also bears principal responsibility for
determining presidential policy on telecommunication issues, which it
often communicates to the FCC.3°9 Thus they are in some ways col-
laborators and in some ways administrative rivals.
305 See, e.g., source cited infra note 313.
306 The order, relaxing a series of longstanding restrictions on concentration in media own-
ership, was largely opposed by small media outlets and the public, and was supported by many of
the nation's largest newspaper companies and television networks. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton,
Regulators Ease Rules Governing Media Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at Al; Ben Scott,
The Politics and Policy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 645, 645-59 (2004).
307 As our earlier discussion indicates, the "side" to which the FCC responded was repre-
sented by organized groups. Individuals' comments were almost always ignored.
308 See 47 U.S.C. § 902(2)(A)-(B) (2006) (providing the NTIA with the authority to assign
spectrum frequencies belonging to the United States); BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 78, at 57.
309 See 47 U.S.C. § 902(2)(D) (directing the NTIA to "serve as the President's principal
adviser on telecommunications policies pertaining to the Nation's economic and technological
advancement and to the regulation of the telecommunications industry").
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In the broadband-over-power-lines proceeding, the NTIA was
the one and only participant whose position was almost wholly
adopted by the FCC. The NTIA submitted comments to the FCC,
and much of the substance of the resulting order came directly from
the NTIA's recommendations. Indeed, the FCC adopted the recom-
mendations of the NTIA even when they came too late for others to
respond to, or covered the same ground that other commenters cov-
ered. With regard to the former, the NTIA proposed that the FCC
require broadband-over-power-line operators to disclose thirty days in
advance of their operations the frequencies they would be using.310
Many commenters complained that this was not proposed in the
FCC's Notice of Proposed Rule Making, and they were therefore not
given a chance to comment on it.311 The FCC responded by adhering
to the NTIA's recommendation.
As to the latter, many commenters submitted proposed models
and engineering studies. 312 After all were submitted, the FCC used
the NTIA's study to develop measurement procedures for broadband
over power lines. In adopting NTIA's recommendation (flowing from
an NTIA study), the FCC explicitly said that it did so in "deference to
NTIA's extensive work. ''313
310 See Comments of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, In
re Carrier Current Systems, Including Broadband over Power Line Systems 10-11 (June 4, 2004).
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=
6516212608 (recommending a 30-day advance notice requirement).
311 See, e.g., Petition for Reconsideration of the United Power Line Council, In re Carrier
Current Systems, Including Broadband over Power Line Systems 3-4 (Feb. 7, 2005), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=6517182250
("The 30-day advance notice requirement for the BPL database was not proposed in the [Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking], and it was only raised in comments by NTIA among others. Conse-
quently, there was inadequate opportunity to comment .... (footnote omitted)).
312 Indeed, almost every corporation opposing the plan to open white spaces to other uses
submitted an engineering study that it claimed supported its position.
313 Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement Guidelines for
Access Broadband over Power Line Systems, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265, 21,310 (2004). Note that the
Commission was not stating that it owed legal deference to the NTIA, and indeed administrative
law does not entail any legal deference to the NTIA's recommendations. Several commenters
objected to such reliance on the NTIA, arguing that its dual role corrupted its position. These
commenters claimed that the NTIA has a duty to objectively test issues such as those before the
Commission, yet it also must support the telecommunications goals of the executive branch.
And, more generally, these commenters noted that they, too, had engaged in extensive work to
which they would appreciate deference. But these complaints were to no avail, and the FCC
adhered to its reliance on the NTIA. See, e.g., Reply Comments of the ARRL, the National
Association for Amateur Radio, In re Carrier Current Systems, Including Broadband over
Power Line Systems 12 (June 22, 2004), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native.or..pdf=pdf&iddocument=6516214645 (making this argument about the NTIA's dual
role as tester and upholder of the executive branch's position).
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Thus, the FCC treated the NTIA differently from the other com-
menters, and this was a difference in kind, not merely degree. The
FCC did not suggest anything close to this level of deference to any
other commenter, and it did not, in fact, adopt the position of any
commenter other than the NTIA.
